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In 2002 R v Shaheed replaced the pnma facie exclusion rule for 
improperly obtained evidence with a balancing exercise to determine whether 
the exclusion of evidence is a proportionate response to the breach in question. 
Academic commentators criticised the new test for both the mechanics of its 
operation and the way particular factors were dealt with, resulting in a bias 
towards admissibility. In response to the perceived uncertainty of the test, the 
Court of Appeal in R v Williams attempted a comprehensive explanation of its 
operation. However, few changes were made to the substantive treatment of 
particular factors, perpetuating the test's failure to adequately vindicate 
impo1iant rights. Soon after the judgment in Williams, the test was replaced by a 
statutory version ins 30 of the Evidence Act 2006. 
This essay evaluates the application of the Shaheed test in cases both 
before and after Williams, and examines the extent to which academic 
commentators' concerns are borne out in practice. While Williams has largely 
alleviated the problems of inconsistency, the bias towards admissibility persists. 
It is argued that the recent enactment of s 30 provides an ideal opportunity for 
the comis to reconsider the balancing process by adopting an interpretative 
approach to certain factors that aims to correct this imbalance. Rights could be 
adequately vindicated within the framework of the s 30 balancing test by 
recognising the impo1iance of the existence of a breach in every case, 
acknowledging that the seriousness of the offence and the centrality of evidence 
to the prosecution's case are both factors that simultaneously support both 
admission and exclusion, and adopting a narrow interpretation of the alternative 
remedies statutory factor. 
Word Length 
The text of this paper ( excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes, 
bibliography and appendices) comprises approximately 15, 484 words. 
Admissibility of improperly obtained evidence-section 30 Evidence Act 2006 
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I INTRODUCTION 
In 2002 R v Shaheed replaced the pnma facie exclusion rule for 
improperly obtained evidence with a balancing exercise to detennine whether 
the exclusion of evidence is a proportionate response to the breach. 1 Scott 
Optican and Peter Sankoff immediately criticised the new test for both its 
uncertainty and systemic bias towards admissibility.2 While careful at the time 
to characterise their assessment as preliminary, in a later comprehensive survey 
of the intermediary case law applying Shaheed, Optican concluded that his and 
Sankoff s earlier critique had been confirmed in practice. 3 
In response to the perceived uncertainty of the Shaheed test, the Court of 
Appeal in R v Williams attempted a comprehensive explanation of its operation, 
with the stated goal of " lay[ing] down a structured approach ... that should lead 
to more consistent results."4 In doing so, Williams took valuable steps towards 
addressing the need for an "identifiable structure for the Shaheed calculus."5 
However, the judgment's contribution to the certainty of the test was 
undermined in places by guidance that was phrased either too generally or too 
specifically to be of material assistance to lower courts. A more problematic 
aspect of Williams is that it made no attempt to address the Shaheed structure's 
unacceptable bias towards admissibility, at the expense of adequate vindication 
of important rights. 
Soon after the judgment in Williams the modified test was replaced by 
the statutory test for admissibility of improperly obtained evidence in s 30 of the 
Evidence Act 2006, which is modelled closely on the Shaheed framework. 6 Its 
introduction provides an ideal opportunity for the courts to reinterpret the way 
the balancing exercise is being carried out in order to address its internal bias. I 
1 R v Shaheed [2002] 2 NZLR 377. 
2 
Scott L Optican and Peter J Sankoff The New Exclusiona,y Rule: A Preliminary Assessment of 
R v Shaheed [2003] NZ Law Review I. 
3 Scott L Optican The New Exclusiona,y Rule: Interpretation and Application of R v Shaheed 
[2004] NZ Law Review 451 , 528. 
4 
R v Williams and Ors [2007] NZCA 52, para 147, Glazebrook J and William Young P. 
5 Optican and Sankoff, above n 2, 28. 
6 The Evidence Act 2006 came into force on I August 2007. 
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will argue that the vindication of rights can be adequately ensured within the 
framework of the s 3 0 balancing exercise by recognising the imp011ance of the 
existence of a breach in every case, acknowledging that the seriousness of the 
offence and the centrality of evidence to the prosecution's case are both factors 
that simultaneously support both admission and exclusion, and confining the 
application of the alternative remedies statutory factor to cases where 
imprisonment is unlikely. 
II SHAHEED 
A Establishment of the balancing test 
I The situation before Shaheed: the primafacie exclus;on rule 
Prior to the judgment in Shaheed in March 2002, New Zealand had a 
prima facie rule of exclusion for evidence obtained in breach of the Bill of 
Rights. The rule created a rebuttable presumption of inadmissibility, which 
could be overridden if a Judge was satisfied that that was the "fair and right" 
course. 7 Established categories of exceptions to the prima facie rule included 
insufficient causal connection, inevitable discovery, lack of standing, and 
situations where no official conduct was involved. 8 
After the Shaheed test was introduced, many of the criticisms directed 
towards it were based on old justifications for the prima facie rule. A common 
theme is that any alternative would not adequately implement New Zealand's 
"rights centred" approach to admissibility.9 The introduction of the balancing 
test was opposed on the grounds that the consideration of "the seriousness of the 
offence, the importance (to a conviction) of the evidence, the availability of 
other investigatory techniques, the reliability of the evidence" and police good 
faith was inappropriate because these factors "provide no sufficient answer to 
7R v Butcher [1992] 2 NZLR 257 (CA) 266; R v Kirifi [1992] 2 NZLR 8 (CA) 8. 
80ptican and Sankoff, above n 2, 3-4; see also R v Goodwin [1993] 2 NZLR 153 (CA) 171, per 
Cooke P. 
9 R v Goodwin, above n 8, 193, per Richardson J; see also David M Paciocco "Remedies for 
Violations of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990" in Rish worth and Paciocco Essays on 
the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (Legal Research Foundation, Publication No 32, 1992). 
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the accused's cry for vindication of rights." 10 In her dissenting judgment in 
Shaheed, Elias J rejected the idea that the rule should be replaced partly because 
it was there to implement the appropriate balance already struck in the Bill of 
Rights between "minimum standards of criminal process and the public interest 
in the detection and prosecution of crime. Once a breach is established a wider 
balancing of interests is not appropriate" .11 It has also been argued that a 
presumption of exclusion is necessary to provide certainty, because the 
"comparatively lucid" rule "gave clear guidance to the police," 12 thus assisting 
"all sides in understanding what must occur for exclusion to take place." 13 
Under the prima facie exclusion rule New Zealand' s law was closer to that in 
the United States of America, which has an exclusionary rule for evidence 
obtained in breach of the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution on the basis 
that it is necessary in order to deter future police transgressions. 14 
The idea of replacing the pnma facie rule with a balancing test for 
exclusion grew out of discontent with the way that the exclusionary rule was 
operating in practice as an "almost automatic" rule of exclusion. 15 Ultimately it 
was argued for the Crown in Shaheed that courts had adopted an overly strict 
approach to the interpretation of the urgency and inconsequentiality exceptions, 
and that waiver and inevitable discovery ought not to be conceived of as 
exceptions at all. 16 In R v Te Kira Thomas J suggested that the prima facie rule 
carried with it "a number of real disadvantages", including the risk of setting 
guilty criminals free, the necessary undervaluing of the rights of victims "who 
can be said to have an interest greater than the community at large 
in ... successful prosecution", forcing judges to "adopt a disciplinary role alien to 
the judicial function", and the fact that it can lead to "strained findings of fact, 
or law, in order to avoid the suppression of probative and relevant evidence." 17 
10 Richard Mahoney " Vindicating Rights: Excluding Evidence Obtained in Violation of the Bill 
of Rights" in Grant Huscroft and Paul Rishworth Rights and Freedoms: the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990 and the Human Rights Act 1993 (Brookers, Wellington, I 995), 453. 11 R v Shaheed, above n I , para 3 86, EI ias J. 
12 Ibid, para 385, Elias J. 
13 Optican and Sankoff, above n 2, 27. 
14 R v Shaheed, above n I, para 74 Blanchard, Richardson and Tipping JJ. 15 Ibid, para 53. 
16 Ibid. 
17 R v Te Kira [1993] 3 NZLR 257, 286, Thomas J. 
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In law and economics te1111s, Walker argued that the exclusionary rule involved 
a net social cost, because exclusion of evidence means that either allocation of 
more resources is necessary to secure more evidence or the chance of conviction 
is decreased. 18
 However, it should be noted that this argument rests on the 
assw11ption that a reduced conviction rate is a "dead weight Joss" to society, and 
does not acknowledge society's contrary interest in having enforcement officers 
comply with the law. Finally, it is argued that the truth-seeking function of the 
criminal justice system is undem1ined by an exclusionary rule which sometimes 
necessitates ignoring reliable evidence.
19 These were the types of concerns that 
ultimately induced the majority in Shaheed to replace the prima facie 
exclusionary rule with the new balancing test. The adoption of the balancing test 
brings New Zealand law closer in line with the Canadian position, where 
admissibility of improperly obtained evidence is determined by a balancing 
exercise covering similar factors to those relevant under Shaheed.
20 However, 
the Canadian test is coloured by the wording of the remedies clause in the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms of which New Zealand has no 
equivalent, which directs that evidence will be excluded if its admission would 
"bring the administration of justice into disrepute. "
21 
2 Summary of the new lest 
I will begin by smm11ansmg the initial formulation of the balancing 
exercise as recorded by Blanchard Jin Shaheed.
22 Under the balancing exercise, 
a judge asked to exclude evidence obtained by a breach of the Bill of Rights 
must decide whether exclusion is a proportionate response to the breach.
23 
Blanchard J was careful to note that the list of factors given was not intended to 
18 Walker "Wilkes and Liberty: A Critique of the Prima Facie Exclusion Rule" (1996) 17 
NZULR 69, 82. 
19 Ibid, 81. 
20 Optican and Sankoff, above n 2, 19. 
21 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 1982, s 24(2), Part I of the Constitution Act 1982 
(Canada Act 1992 (UK), sch B). 
22 R v Shaheed, above n I. Richardson and Tipping JJ joined in Blanchard J's judgment, Gault 
and Anderson JJ delivered concurring judgments, McGrath J partially concurred, and Elias 
CJ 
dissented. 
23 Ibid, para 156. 
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be exhaustive.24 In addition, it was explained that "[t]o isolate a particular factor 
would be to misunderstand the discussion and would lead to possible distortion 
of the process". 25 
This clarification was followed by a paragraph indicating that where the 
interference with a right is trivial, an insufficient causal connection existed 
between the breach and the discovery of the evidence, the evidence would 
inevitably have been legitimately discovered, or there had been a fully info1med 
waiver of the relevant right the balancing exercise is unnecessary.26 These 
' knockout blows' reflected the established categories of exceptions that had 
developed under the old prima facie rule of exclusion. Under the prima facie 
rule, the triviality and insufficient causal connection points were encompassed 
within the inconsequentiality exception.27 
In terms of factors to be considered under the balancing test, we are told 
that that the "starting point should always be the nature of the right and the 
breach."28 Where rights are fundamental in nature and intrusions are serious, 
this will count heavily against admissibility. If the search was conducted in 
urgent or dangerous circumstances, the presence of these factors can operate to 
make the intrusion less serious than it would at first appear. 29 
Where police misconduct is characterised as deliberate, reckless or 
grossly careless, "[ e ]xclusion will often be the only appropriate response". 30 The 
majority declined to accept the view of the Irish Supreme Court that the 
violator's awareness of the violation is irrelevant, because "[a]n action not 
known to be a breach of rights does not merit the same degree of condemnation 
as one which is known to be so".31 Blanchard J clarified that good faith on the 
24 Ibid, para 145. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid, para 146. 
27 R v Te Kira, above n 17, 261, per Cooke P. For a discussion of the importance of a causal 
co1111ection between the breach and the evidence obtained, see Minisl!y of Transport v Noort 
[1992] 3 NZLR 260,274 per Cooke P. 
28 R v Shaheed, above n 1, para 147 Blanchard, Richardson and Tipping JJ. 
29 Ibid . 
30 Ibid, para 148. 
31 Ibid. 
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part of the police is to be treated as a neutral factor, because police courtesy is 
expected where the prefened approach is "rights centred".
32 
The next factor considered by the Blanchard J was the availability of 
alternative, lawful investigative techniques. Where the police were aware of the 
existence of such techniques and persisted in an illegal course of conduct, this 
would suggest that exclusion is appropriate.33 This is consistent with the judicial 
approach taken to alternative techniques under the old exclusionary rule.
34 Their 
analysis of this factor is consistent with, but does not make reference to, earlier 
dicta to the effect that where "a search wanant is readily obtainable [but not 
obtained] that must tell strongly against an unauthorised search."
35 
Blanchard J then considered the nature and quality of the challenged 
evidence.36 He opined that improperly obtained evidence of doubtful reliability 
is to be given "little or no weight", suggesting that the reliability of evidence is 
likely to be a nearly conclusive factor. 3
7 Reliability concerns are most likely to 
be present in situations where improperly obtained evidence is confessional in 
nature, whereas for real evidence "the probative value of that discovery may be 
a weighty factor. "38 The Court disagreed with the Supreme Court of Canada's 
opinion that the use of real evidence of undoubted reliability could make a trial 
unfair, preferring to regard the fairness of a trial as only compromised where the 
verdict may be unsafe.39 
Another factor that would weigh in favour of admission is the centrality 
of the evidence to the prosecution' s case, in the sense that the case is unlikely to 
succeed if the evidence caimot be adduced. This factor is consistently coupled 
with the reliability of the evidence in the judgment. They refer to evidence as 
"probative and crucial", "not only reliable but also crucial", and imply that the 
32 Tbid, para 149. 
33 Ibid, para 150. 
34 See R v Jefferies [1994] I NZLR 290, 305 , per Richardson J. 
35 R v Grayson & Taylor [1997] I NZLR 399, 408. 
36 R v Shaheed, above n I, para 15 I Blanchard, Richardson and Tipping JJ. 
37 lbid . 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid . 
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centrality factor will only be a valid consideration where "the admission ... will 
not lead to an unfair trial". 40 Evidence that is reliable and central could 
potentially outweigh even a serious breach when coupled with the other major 
factor in favour of admission, serious offending. 41 
The majority then turned to consider whether a breach that led to the 
discovery of vital and reliable evidence could ever be adequately vindicated by 
remedies other than exclusion, and if so, whether that consideration could ever 
properly infonn the balancing exercise.42 They decided that a declaration of the 
breach or disciplinary proceedings against the perpetrator could never 
effectively redress a breached right in this context.43 This statement is consistent 
with the approach taken to the issue of adequacy of alternative remedies in 
earlier case law.44 The judgment in Shaheed implied that an award of Baigent 
damages or a reduction in a sentence of imprisonment in compensation for use 
of improperly obtained evidence at trial may be interpreted as condoning police 
breaches of rules, and bring the administration of justice into disrepute.45 In that 
case, the public perception that police breaches of rights are condoned would be 
a negative side effect that would outweigh any benefit gained by the conviction 
of serious offenders.46 For these reasons, the majority decided that where a 
conviction is likely to lead to a sentence of imprisonment, the availability of 
alternative remedies should not be considered under the balancing exercise.47 
They remained silent as to the proper approach in a situation where a conviction 
is unlikely to lead to imprisonment. The majority' s conclusion on alternative 
remedies was explicitly endorsed by Gault J, who added that any assessment of 
alternative remedies would require making assumptions about the significance 
of evidence and the outcome of a trial which ca1mot realistically be evaluated 
"at the time of determining admissibility of evidence".48 
40 Ibid, para 152. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid , para 153. 
43 Ibid . 
44 R v Te Kira, above n 17, 276, per Richardson J. 
45 R v Shaheed, above n I, para 154 Blanchard, Richardson and Tipping JJ. 
46 lbid. 
47 Ibid, para 155. 
48 Ibid, para 173 Gault J. 
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In summary, the factors from Shaheed to be taken into account in the 
balancing exercise are nature of the right and the breach, police conduct, 
alternative investigative techniques, the reliability and centrality of evidence 
discovered and the seriousness of the offence in question. As these factors are 
weighed, "appropriate and significant weight" must be given to the existence of 
the breach and the need to maintain an effective and credible system of justice.49 
Blanchard J concluded this section of his judgment by commenting that while 
the new approach should lead to "a greater exercise of judgment", overall the 
results should largely be the same as under the earlier rule,50 a sentiment 
mirrored in thejudgment of Anderson J. 51 
3 Early academic commentary 
The judgment in Shaheed generated a wealth of academic comment, 
both positive and negative. A particularly worthy critical account of the new test 
is found in Optican and Sankoff' s preliminary assessment. 52 After the 
qualification that any analysis must necessarily be tentative until the effect of 
the new rule is explored in practice, the authors went on to make various 
criticisms of the new test. 53 Firstly, they attributed the absence of discussion in 
Shaheed of justifications for the abandonment of the prima facie rule to a thinly 
veiled judicial preference for "an exclusionary rule based on 'crime control' 
values rather than those of ' due process ' and the protection of rights."54 
Secondly, it was argued that the new test was "horribly uncertain and capable of 
infinite manipulation and abuse", as it promulgates a non-exhaustive list of 
relevant factors and insufficient guidance as to the relationship between them.55 
Under this head the validity of some factors favouring admissibility were 
challenged because of the "pernicious 'ends-means' reasoning"56 that they 
represent. That article was followed a year later by another article by Optican 
49 Ibid, para 156. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid, para 202 Anderson J. 
52 Optican and Sankoff, above n 2. 
53 Ibid 2 
54 lbid: 1s-19. 
55 Ibid 27 
56 Ibid: 24: 
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which omitted the earlier criticisms of the decision to adopt a balancing exercise 
per se, but concluded that his and Sankoff s earlier criticisms had been 
effectively borne out in practice. 57 
By contrast, a worthy example of early academic commentary 
advocating the new test is an article by Simon Mount. 58 Like Optican and 
Sankoff, Mount emphasised the necessarily preliminary nature of his evaluation, 
but argued that Shaheed represented a positive development unlikely to result in 
the erosion of defendants' rights in practice. 59 Mount believed that the concerns 
of unce1iainty following Shaheed were exaggerated, because a period of "initial 
uncertainty" would be likely to be followed by the development of a body of 
precedent from which "relatively certain predictions" could be drawn.60 Also he 
argued that there was nothing inherent in the nature of a balancing test that 
would undermine rights, and that the test as formulated in Shaheed was in terms 
so neutral that it was equally capable of being used to admit more evidence, 
preserve the status quo, or exclude evidence more readily than before.61 
While Mount's optimistic view of the potential effects of Shaheed was a 
valid preliminary thesis, with the benefit of hindsight it can be shown that the 
practical effects of Shaheed have more closely resembled Optican' s bleaker 
prediction. For this reason, this essay adopts some of Optican' s concerns as a 
framework for evaluating the subsequent case law. 
A Criticisms of the mechanics of the Shaheed test 
In 2003 , Optican and Sankoff observed that "full evaluation of the new 
exclusionary rule will not be possible until a critical mass of judgments applies 
Shaheed to diverse types of criminal case".62 By the time of the publication of 
Optican' s second article he noted that "while the case law may still be in its 
57 Optican, above n 3, 528. 
58 Simon Mount R v Shaheed: the Prima Facie Exclusion Rule Re-examined [2003] I NZLR 45 . 
59 Ibid , 46. 
60 Ibid, 69. 
61 Ibid, 67. 
62 Optican and Sankoff, above n 2, 2. 
13 
infancy,"63 it was nevertheless possible to "evaluate the actual operation of 
Shaheed as illustrated in decided cases. "64 After analysing the five dozen High 
Court and Court of Appeal cases that had applied the new test he concluded that 
his and Sankoff's earlier criticisms remained pertinent.
65 It is now almost three 
years since Optican's second assessment. During that time, the case law which 
was then described as in its "infancy" has more than doubled,
66 providing a 
much greater "critical mass of cases" with which to analyse the effectiveness of 
the Shaheed test.67 The following section will examine the validity of Optican's 
criticisms relating to uncertainty and assess the extent to which they are have 
been confirmed or contradicted in practice by decisions between the conclusion 
of his study and the Court of Appeal's decision in Williams. 
For consistency, Optican' s parameter of confining the survey to cases 
decided at the High Court and Court of Appeal level is adopted. In addition, my 
san1ple is limited to cases which either actually apply Shaheed or include an 
obiter dicta discussion of the application of Shaheed test that amounts to more 
than a perfunctory or conclusive statement about the likely result. Relevant 
cases have been occurring at roughly the same rate. Optican's study, which 
spanned a little over two years, covered over five dozen cases,
68 and the 68 
relevant decisions between the conclusion of his study and the Court of 
Appeal's decision in Williams contained 76 applications of Shaheed to various 
sets of facts. 69 
I Lack of use of precedent 
Optican' s first criticism is that in almost all of the decisions, "no other 
Shaheed judgment is cited as precedent for the instant result",70
 depriving the 
63 Optican, above n 3, 457. 
64 Ibid, 456. 
65 Ibid, 528 . 
66 Ibid, 457. 
67 Optican and Sankoff, above n 2, 2. 
68 Optican, above n 3, 456. 
69 In some cases the Shaheed test was applied to more than one set of facts within a single 
judgment. 
70 Optican, above n 3,457. 
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applications of the necessary "principled coherency". 71 The validity of this 
criticism may be challenged on the grounds that any form of reasoning by 
precedent is contrary to the very nature of a balancing test. However, an 
increased willingness to consider precedent could promote consistency, 
provided that the exercise is conducted with some degree of flexibility. 
While Optican found that in "almost every" case no other Shaheed 
judgment was cited, in my san1ple 13 cases made reference to other Shaheed 
cases. One case involving an unreasonable search of a motor vehicle argues 
entirely by analogy with the earlier case of R v Maihi,72 by summarising the 
application of the test in that case, comparing the facts to the ones under 
consideration, and concluding accordingly. 73 While the cases which cite 
Shaheed precedent represent only approximately one sixth of my sample, which 
may be a lower proportion than is desirable, the figure is an improvement on the 
situation as reported by Optican in 2004. This is perhaps an unsurprising 
development, because as the body of Shaheed precedent accumulates over time 
there will be more chance of a precedent existing bearing a factual similarity to 
a case at hand. This suggests that Optican' s first concern has been partially 
alleviated since his aiiicle, a trend which may continue in the future as more 
cases are decided. 
2 Inadequate balancing 
Secondly Optican points to the use of inadequate balancing, as 
illustrated by cases which demonstrate "perfunctory or conclusive reasoning", 
"mysteriously selective application", or "focus[ing] on one or more relevant 
considerations to the exclusion of others relevai1t to the case." 74 With respect to 
the last exainple, Optican argues that courts are obliged to account for all 
pertinent considerations in the balancing exercise, therefore while judges are 
71 Ibid. 
72 R v Mai hi (2002) 19 CRNZ 453 . 
73 R v Torvald (25 August 2006) HC AK CR1 2005-092-014606, para 31-38; see also R v 
Anderson (23 February 2005) CA 388/04, para 41-43. 
74 Optican, above n 3, 461. 
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free to prioritise some factors over others they must nevertheless explain why 
omission of ostensibly relevant factors is appropriate. 
75 
A large number of cases in my sample had the characteristics 
complained of by Optican of being either "mysteriously selective" or elevating 
one or more factors to determinative importance while making no reference to 
other, potentially relevant factors. For example, in Plumb v Police the doubtful 
reliability of the evidence was treated as a determinative factor. 
76 While the 
treatment of doubtful reliability as a knockout blow has been advocated by 
academic commentators, 77 w1der Shaheed it was only to be taken into account 
as one, albeit heavily weighted, factor. 78 It is arguable that the treatment of bad 
faith as a determinative factor was mandated by the wording of Shaheed, which 
stated that if police behaved in a grossly careless manner or worse "exclusion 
will often be the only appropriate response", 
79 which could explain the two 
cases that treated it as such.80 However, the opposite is true where the absence 
of bad faith is elevated to conclusive status, since this factor was explicitly 
stated to be neutral. 81 This was effectively the position in R v Owen, where the 
only factor mentioned in the balancing exercise was that the officer executing a 
warrant would have been clearly justified in thinking that it contained adequate 
grounds. 82 There were also examples of cases which considered only two 
factors83 or cases which considered more than two factors but nevertheless 
neglected to analyse factors relevant to the case.84 
However, when considering the validity of Optican's inadequate 
balancing complaint it should be kept in mind that lapses in adequate balancing 
75 Ibid, 462. 
76 Plumb v Police (19 September 2006) HC AK CRI 2005-404-95, para 32. 
77 Optican, above n 3, 500. 
78 R v Shaheed, above n I, para 151 Blanchard, Richardson and Tipping JJ. 
79 Ibid, para 148. 
80 R v Williams (No 8) (6 September 2005) HC AK CRI 2004-404-003697, para 97; Traber v 
Police (I December 2004) HC MAS CRI 2004-435-20, para 43. 
81 R v Shaheed, above n I, para 146 Blanchard, Richardson and Tipping JJ. 
82 R v Owen (25 July 2006) CA 213/06, para 18. 
83 See R v M (6 December 2005) HC NEL CR! 2005-042-00 I 981 , para 24; Collins v Police (8 
November 2006) HC AK CRI 2006-404-000152, para 49; R v Cummings (23 March 2006) HC 
CHCH CRI 2005-009-009014, para 21. 
84 See R v Siauane (25 October 2006) HC AK CRT 2006-092-004989, para 50; R v Rogers 
[2006] 2 NZLR 156 (CA), para 71-73; R v Save/io (5 August 2005) CA 234/96, para 52. 
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are necessarily more forgivable in cases where the Shaheed application is obiter 
or the evidence is ultimately excluded. Of my examples above, the only cases 
that do not fall into either category are R v Owen and R v M. The fact that most 
examples of inadequate balancing come from cases that ultimately excluded 
evidence suggests that the inadequate balancing concern may be overstated. 
To Optican' s concerns under the heading of inadequate balancing my 
sample would suggest that another could be added, that is, reasoning that is 
illogically ordered to the point that double counting of particular elements 
becomes an issue. In a few cases, the reasoning leaps from factor to factor and 
returns to ones already dealt with. For example, the balancing section of Hunter 
v Police both begins and ends with an analysis of the seriousness of the 
offence. 85 Also, in R v Kata reliability was treated the san1e way when the Court 
considered whether or not an interviewee had been subject to undue cross-
examination when offering a voluntary statement under Rule 7 of the Judges ' 
Rules. 86 Asher J applied the Shaheed test separately to an offensive part of the 
interview and the balance of the evidence. In considering the offensive part, he 
stated that the manner of questioning had become so overbearing that the 
reliability of the statement was in doubt.87 However, later in the same balance 
he said that the evidence was of "reasonable quality."88 The structure of the 
reasoning invites concern that the nature and quality of evidence was considered 
more than once in a contradictory matter. Whether or not that was in fact the 
case is not clear, but it would be preferable for courts to contain all their 
reasoning for each factor in one place for maximum transparency. 
3 Consideration of inappropriate factors 
Next Optican notes the consideration of inappropriate factors in the 
balancing exercise. Several examples are found, including the accused ' s belief 
85 Hunter v Police [2005) OCR 936, paras 45 and 53 ; see also R v Williams (Michael) (21 
December 2005) HC HAM CRI 2005-019-001588, paras 61-64 . 
86 R v Kata ( I November 2005) HC AK CRI 2004-092-0 I 3265 . 
87 Ibid, para 93. 
88 Ibid, para 94. 
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in the propriety of the search,89 the fact that the jury had already heard the 
evidence,90 and factors that are relevant to the lawfulness and reasonableness of 
a search itself.91 He acknowledged that the consideration of such factors could 
be mandated by the explicit statement in Shaheed that the factors provided are 
not an exhaustive list,92 but argued that a "blank cheque" for courts to consider 
factors "essentially umelated to the factors set out in Shaheed' was not 
intended.93 As the examples below illustrate, my sample indicates that courts are 
still inclined to take irrelevant factors into consideration. 
(a) Good faith 
Shaheed reaffirmed the "often overlooked expectation" that politeness 
and courtesy on the part of the police are expected at all times,94 therefore the 
fact that a right is breached in good faith should not be treated as anything other 
than a neutral factor. 95 Some of the cases applying the test explicitly 
acknowledge the neutral status of good faith. 96 However, many cases note the 
absence of police misconduct but are silent as to whether it is appreciated that 
that factor is neutral, or whether they are giving it some weight in the analysis.
97 
More worrying are cases that explicitly treat good faith as a factor carrying 
some weight. A typical example is R v Tweeddale, where the fact that police 
were acting in good faith is included in a bulleted list of factors that the Court 
regarded as determinative.98 Even more explicit is the lower court judgment in R 
v Sua which, after finding that there was no bad faith,99 stated that "[if] the 
focus of the balancing exercise was solely on the actions and the bona tides of 
89 Optican, above n 3, 460; see also R v Lapham (2003) 20 CRNZ 286 (CA). 
90 Jbid , 463-6; see also R v Allison (9 April 2003) HC AK T 002481. 
91 Optican, ibid, 467; see also R v Rollinson (23 March 2003) CA 434/02 . 
92 R v Shaheed, above n 1, para 145 Blanchard, Richardson and Tipping JJ . 
93 Optican, above n 3, 468. 
94 R v Michalaros ( 4 August 2005) HC HAM CRI 2005-019-000304, para 55 . 
95 R v Shaheed, above n I, para 149. 
96 R v Rangihuna (28 September 2006) HC CHCH CRJ 2005-009-000005, para 48; R v Yorston 
(7 March 2006) HC AK CRI 2005-004-018740, para 42; R v Mitchell (31 August 2005) CA 
160/05, para 53 . 
97 For example R v Siauane, above n 84, para 49; R v Savelio, above n 84, para 52; R v McFall 
[2005) BCL 631, para 34; R v Barnett (9 December 2004) HC WN CR! 2004-085-002076, para 
26. 
98 R v Tweeddale (7 September 2006) CA 38-06, para 32; see also R v fwihora (29 November 
2006) HC AK CRJ 2006-055-000403, paras 20 and 23. 
99 R v Sua (20 September 2005) HC AK CRJ 2004-090-0 I 0665, para 31. 
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the police, the evidence here would be admitted. However, that.. .is but one 
factor." 100 Perhaps the most problematic example was R v Owen where, as has 
been shown, the absence of good faith was elevated to determinative status. 101 
In R v Torvatd1°2 Venning J cited R v Maihi for the proposition that good faith 
"tells not so much in favour of admissibility, rather it is the absence of a factor 
which would have pointed strongly in favour of exclusion." 103 This kind of 
reasoning perpetuates confusion because it would be impossible to take into 
account the absence of a factor which would have pointed strongly in favour of 
exclusion in any real way without giving good faith some positive weight in the 
balancing exercise. 
(b) 'Knockout blows' 
At the inception of the Shaheed test, certain factors were singled out as 
'knockout blows'. 104 Their presence would result in automatic exclusion of 
disputed evidence, rendering the application of Shaheed unnecessary. Initially 
these were where the intrusion was trivial, there was an attenuated causal link 
between the breach and the discovery of the evidence, the evidence would 
inevitably have been discovered, or the right had been waived. 105 However, 
despite this guidance the treatment of both the causation point and the inevitable 
discovery point has been ambivalent in practice. 
While some cases involving an attenuated causal link took their analysis 
no further than a finding of insufficient causation, 106 others treated the strength 
of the causative link as a factor in the balancing exercise. 107 In R v Siauane, the 
High Court decided that had the innocent misrepresentation that formed the 
'
00 Ibid, para 32. 
10 1 R v Owen, above n 82, para 18. 
102 R v Torvald, above n 73, para 30. 
103 R v Maihi, above n 72, para 34. This statement may have descended from Shaheed itself, 
where Blanchard J said that in a good faith situation "[t]he best that can be said is that there is an 
absence of bad faith: R v Shaheed, above n I, para 149. 
104 R v Shaheed, ibid, para 146 Blanchard, Richardson and Tipping JJ. 
'
05 Ibid, para 146. 
106 For example R v Clark (1 2 June 2006) CA 479/05, para 24; Sv Police [2006] NZFLR 961 , 
para 67. 
107 See for example R v Mitchell, above n 96, para 36; R v Mitchell ( 10 May 2005) HC AK CRI 
2004-044-006481 , para 44. 
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breach in question not occmTed, the interviewee' s answer would have been the 
same. 108 This consideration was then balanced alongside the quality and 
centrality of the evidence in order to find that the evidence was admissible. 
Similarly in Hunter v PoUce a finding of insufficient connection was balanced 
alongside most other Shaheed factors to contribute to a finding of 
admissibility. 109 
A similarly ambivalent stance is apparent towards the treatment of 
inevitable discovery as a knockout blow. One case cites the earlier authority of 
R v Doyle for the proposition that inevitable discovery was to be treated as a 
factor in the Shaheed analysis rather than as a knockout. 110 Tacit acceptance of 
this proposition may underlie the treatment of inevitable discovery as merely 
one factor in the balance in R v Thomas, 111 R v Castle, 112 and the minority 
judgment in R v Hata. 11 3 At both the High Cami and Court of Appeal levels in 
R v Jwihora, inevitable discovery was treated as negating the need to have 
recourse to the alternative lawful investigative techniques. 11 4 In contrast to this 
line of authority, in R v Ngan Miller J maintained the original Shaheed position 
by treating inevitable discovery as a knockout blow rendering the application of 
the balancing exercise unnecessary. 115 
( c) Matters going to lawfulness and reasonableness 
Optican characterised the consideration of points going to the legality 
and reasonableness of official acts as inappropriate, using the exan1ple of 
Rollinson, where "most of the ' factors ' said to favour exclusion in the judgment 
have little or nothing to do with those set out in Shaheed' and "relate essentially 
to the lawfulness and reasonableness of the search itself." 11 6 The practice of 
considering these issues has continued beyond the publication of Optican' s 
108 R v Siauane, above n 84, para 50. 
109 Hunter v Police, above n 85 , para 50. 
11 0 R v Goodin (9 February 2005) HC AK CRT 2004-055-00 I 440, para 67. 
111 R v Thomas (7 July 2005) CA 173/05, para 9. 
11 2 R v Castle [2005] DCR 517, para 30. 
11 3 R v Hat a (21 August 2006) CA 441 /05, para 57, per Baragwanath J. 
114 R v lwihora (5 February 2007) CA 463 /06, para 21 ; R v lwihora (HC), above n 98, para 21 . 
11 5 R v Ngan (27 June 2005) HC WN CR! 2004-054-001295, para 21. 
11 6 Optican, above n 3, 467. 
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article. 117 However, in my op1ruon factors relevant to the lawfulness and 
reasonableness of the search can be legitimately taken into account under the 
nature of the breach aspect of the balancing exercise. 118 It is clear from the 
analysis in Shaheed of this factor that some consideration of the extent of the 
illegality is involved. 119 In many cases, this inquiry would encompass 
considerations of legality and reasonableness. Consistently with Optican's 
assessment of Rollinson, their consideration only becomes problematic where 
they are taken into account at the expense of other relevant factors. Sua and 
Pierce are less objectionable in this respect because the factors going to the 
reasonableness of police actions, while remaining dominant considerations, 
were cursorily balanced against other Shaheed factors. Optican' s objection to 
the reasoning in Rollinson is better conceived of as an inadequate balancing 
concern, rather than a question of considering inappropriate factors. 
( d) Other inappropriate factors 
Other examples of consideration of inappropriate factors occur in my 
sample. In one case, the Court held that an accused' s prior familiarity with the 
justice system could be taken into account to mitigate the seriousness of a 
breach, 120 without apparent appreciation of the double jeopardy implications of 
such a stance. Similarly, in R v Umuhiri it was held that a decision to conduct a 
warrantless search could be partly validated by the fact that the conflict between 
the accused's gang and another one had caused loss of life before. 12 1 This 
problematically involves the assumption that Umuhiri ' s right to be free from 
unreasonable search and seizure is somehow undermined by the past actions of 
people with whom he associates. 
However, it is important to give effect to the acknowledgement in 
Shaheed that the listed factors are not intended to be exhaustive. 122 The cases 
117 R v Rangihuna (14 December 2006) CA 365-06, para 46(a); R v Sua, above n 99, para 28; R 
v Pierce (21 June 2005) HC AK CRI 2004-004-024268, para 45 . 
118 See R v Reese (2 March 2007) HC CHCH CRI 2005-009-0 l O l 84, para 95 . 
11 9 R v Shaheed, above n 1, para 147. 
120 R v Clayton & Ors (No 1) (21 November 2006) HC WN CRI 2005-078-001785, para 33. 
121 R v Umuhiri (29 October 2004) HC ROT CRI 2004-463-000064, para 11. 
122 R v Shaheed, above n I, para 145 Blanchard, Richardson and Tipping JJ. 
applying Shaheed do present some legitimate additional factors for inclusion in 
the balance where relevant. Some cases incorporate the particular vulnerabilities 
of the accused into the balance, such as the accused's difficult family 
backgrow1d in R v Rogers. 123 While this factor may seem conunonplace and 
unworthy of inclusion in the balancing test, in that case it warranted 
consideration as it had a direct bearing on the breach, which involved inducing 
the accused to agree to a reconstruction of the murder he was charged with by 
telling him it would be an opportunity to see his estranged family. Other specific 
vulnerabilities regarding language and comprehension abilities were considered 
in R v Barreiro-Teixeira 124 and R v Kata 125 respectively, although they did not 
contribute to the balancing exercise. Another example of a relevant factor not 
articulated in Shaheed is seen in the minority judgment in R v Hata, where the 
wellbeing of maltreated horses that were unreasonably seized was held to be 
relevant. 126 The inclusion of this factor was appropriate as it raised a relevant 
concern that could not be accommodated within the regular Shaheed factors, 
which do not envisage the wmsual situation where living things are seized. 
Questionable interpretation ofShaheedfactors 
Optican's final criticism regarding the certainty of the test concerns the 
"questionable interpretation of the meaning and explication of the Shaheed 
factors themselves." 127 His first concern under this head relates to some 
apparent confusion over exactly what constitutes a serious charge, and whether 
the appropriate standard is the nature of the offence itself or the consequences in 
a given case. 128 This criticism is borne out by my later sample. While the 
majority of judgments assess seriousness by the latter criteria, an approach that 
has since been endorsed in Williams, 129 in R v Castle 130 and the majority 
123 R v Rogers, above n 84, para 71 . 
124 R v Barreiro-Teixeira (4 April 2006) HC AK CRI 2005-092-004272, para 27. 
125 R v Kata, above n 86. 
126 R v Hata, above n 113, paras 39 and 56, per Chambers and Venning JJ. 
127 Optican, above n 3, 467. 
128 Ibid, 469 ; Optican's discussion relates to R v 1 (2002) CRNZ 4 I 3 and Police v Wallis (22 
May 2002) HC DUN AP 30/01. 
129 R v Williams, above n 4, para 134, Glazebrook J and William Young P. 
130 R v Castle, above n 112, para 30. 
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judgment in R v Hata 131 only the maximum penalty available for the offence in 
question was cited as evidence of serious offending. A preferable approach is 
seen in R v Firman, where it was acknowledged that where possession of 
methamphetamine is the charge, the quantity of methamphetamine found in a 
given case is relevant, and it was the large volume found in the car that Mr 
Firman was driving that made the public interest in securing convictions an 
important factor. 132 Similarly in Hunter v Police, a case involving a charge of 
driving with excess blood alcohol content, it was the fact that Mr Hunter's blood 
contained over twice the legal limit and that public safety was at stake that 
aggravated the seriousness of an otherwise more minor offence. 133 The offence 
was described as "a bad case of its type in an area ofreal concem." 134 
Optican's next concern relates to the arguing technique of evaluating 
against extreme examples. 135 By this he means an interpretive strategy whereby 
a judge diminishes the significance of the facts of the case in front of them by 
contrasting them with an "even more egregious hypothetical case". 136 One 
example given is R v Haapu where the seriousness of Haapu's burglary crime 
was minimised by reference to murder. 137 His second example is R v Vercoe, 
where Baragwanath J contrasted a violation of s 22 of the Bill of Rights with the 
"paradigm case in which the police arrive on a man's doorstep, take him into 
custody and interrogate him at the police station." 138 My sample included more 
examples of cases using the reasoning technique of evaluating against 
hypothetical extreme examples. 139 However, while Optican disapproved of this 
arguing technique as "a process of questionable comparison", I do not think that 
this kind of reasoning under Shaheed is per se objectionable. 14° For example, 
where judges are required to locate offending on a scale of seriousness I can 
131 R v Hata, above n 113, para 31, per Chambers and Venning JJ. 
132 R v Firman (16 December 2004) CA 351 /04., para 29; see also Graham v Blenheim District 
Court (10 October 2006) HC BLE CIV 2006-406-000119. 
133 Hunter v Police, above n 85, para 53. 
134 Ibid. 
135 Optican, above n 3, 470-1. 
136 Ibid, 4 71. 
137 R v Haapu [2002] 19 CRNZ 616 (CA). 
138 R v Vercoe (6 September 2002) HC ROTT 01/3866. 
139 See R v Collings [2005] DCR 714, para 102; R v Reese, above n 118, para 69; R v Beattie & 
Ors (31 May 20050) HC AK CRI 2003-004-025599, para 235. 
140 Optican, above n 3,471. 
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appreciate the temptation of using this kind of logic to ai1iculate that the offence 
falls somewhere in the mid-ranges of the scale. Unless this argumentation 
method is employed to conceal a factually insupportable conclusion, it is unfair 
to criticise a judge for resorting to this type of reasoning to explain their 
characterisation of a pai"ticulai· fact. 
Optican's final criticism relating to the questionable interpretation of 
factors points to difficulties with the characterisation of police behaviour, an 
area susceptible to legitimate judicial disagreement.
141 Examples showing the 
scope for legitimate disagreement can be found within my sample with respect 
to other Shaheed factors. For example, R v Fowler contained the surprising 
conclusion that an insignificant invasion of privacy was involved in a search of 
a wallet, 142 and in Rangihuna the same was said of a search into drawers and 
cupboards, despite the fact that these areas are typically thought of as private. 
143 
In R v Hata, the majority and minority judgments expressed different opinions 
of the urgency involved in a situation of seizing horses from an environment of 
maltreatment. The majority held that "[w]hile Mr Wilson was concerned for the 
horses it cannot be said to have been a situation of urgency."
144 Baragwanath J 
in dissent challenged this characterisation, choosing to "respectfully disagree 
with the majority that [Mr Wilson's] delay in acting signified lack of 
urgency." 145 These examples show that the scope for legitimate judicial 
disagreement about the interpretation of Shaheed factors continues to undermine 
the consistent application of the balancing exercise. 
5 Summary 
In conclusion, many of the concerns raised by Optican about the 
application of the Shaheed test are confirmed by cases decided between his 
article and the judgment in Williams. I have noted that the habit of judges not to 
141 Optican, ibid, 471-4. 
14? I ( - R v Fow er 5 February 2007) CA 418/06, para 17; contrast R v Yeh & Ors (31 August 2007) 
HC AK CRI 2206-004-22722, para 90. 
143 R v Rangihuna, above n 96, para 41 ; endorsed in R v Rangihuna (CA), above n 117, para 
46(e). 
144 R v Hata, above n 113, para 27 and 30, per Chambers and Venning JJ. 
145 R v Hata, ibid, para 38, per Baragwanath J. 
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cite other Shaheed applications may be changing gradually, and have challenged 
Optican' s criticism of the taking into account of matters going to lawfulness and 
reasonableness and the technique of arguing against extreme examples. 
However, even when relatively minor points are taken out of consideration, 
Optican's criticisms relating to the inadequate balancing of factors, the 
consideration of inappropriate factors, and the questionable interpretation of 
factors have been vindicated by the subsequent case law. 
B Criticisms of substantive treatment of factors 
1 Existence of a breach, nature of the right and nature of the breach 
These three separate inquiries replace the presumption of exclusion that 
existed before Shaheed, and are the main vehicle for vindicating the accused's 
rights under the new test. In Shaheed, Blanchard J treated the existence of a 
breach as an umbrella concept that was to be "give[n] appropriate and 
significant weight" as the test was conducted, along with the need to ensure the 
credibility of the justice system. 146 This nature of the right and the nature of the 
breach were described as the "starting point" of the exercise. 147 Under this 
inquiry, the nature of the right deals with the extent to which the right is 
considered fundamental, and the nature of the breach covered issues such as the 
extent of the illegality, the seriousness of the intrusion, and any mitigating 
factors such as urgency or public danger. 148 
Despite the fundamental significance of these concerns, both the fact of 
the breach and the nature of the right are commonly disregarded in practice. 
Most cases applying the Shaheed test do not explicitly mention the fact of a 
breach, an approach which is tacitly mandated by the decision in Shaheed to 
include this point only in a concluding paragraph after the mechanics of the test 
had been explained. By contrast, in a minority of cases courts have been aware 
of the need to give significant weight to the existence of a breach. For example, 
146 R v Shaheed, above n 1, para 156 Blanchard, Richardson and Tipping JJ. 
147 Ibid, para 147. 
148 Ibid. 
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in R v Collings Winkelmaim J held that the fact of a breach had to be given 
great weight, 149 and in R v Firman the Court noted that they must bear in mind 
that the exercise was to be conducted against the background of a breach. 150 In 
R v Rangihuna it was held that in the absence of any factors pointing strongly 
towards admissibility, courts should defer to the fact that a right has been 
breached. 151 
Despite the fact that Shaheed described the nature of the right as one half 
of the starting point of any balancing exercise, it is often disregarded in cases 
dealing with rights other than the right to be free from unreasonable search and 
seizure. In most s 21 cases, the nature of the right is dealt with by considering 
the strength of the privacy interest in a given case, for example by stating the 
that expectation of privacy in a residence is paramount, and superior to that in a 
motor vehicle. 152 A few cases attempt to characterise rights other than s 21. The 
right to have a lawyer present in s 23(1)(b) of the Bill of Rights has been 
variously described as "important" 153 and "fundamental" .154 In R v Clayton the 
fundamentality of Rule 2 of the Judges' Rules was considered to have a bearing 
on the outcome of the balancing exercise, 155 conversely in R v Kata the fact that 
Rule 7 is not technically a 'right' was given some weight. 156 However, the most 
common practice is to either pay lip service to the "nature of the right and the 
breach" as the starting point, before turning to an application that ignores the 
nature of the right component, 157 or omit to mention the nature of the right 
completely. 158 
149 R v Collings, above n 139, para 53. 
150 R v Firman, above n 132, para 50. See also R v Tanner (9 May 2006) CA 5/06, para 20; R v 
Sua, above n 99, para 30; R v Michalaros, above n 94, para 54; R v McFall, above n 97, para 35; 
R v Hooper (24 March 2005) HC GIS CRl 2003-016-006805, para 45; R v Anderson, above n 
73, para 43; R v Barnett, above n 97, para 26. 
151 R v Rangihuna (CA), above n 117, para 55. 
152 See for example R v Gray (8 March 2007) HC AK CRI 2006-044-001207, para 30; R v 
Reese, above n 118, para 69; R v Rangihuna (HC) above n 96, para 48; R v Taylor (3 May 2006) 
CA 384/05, para 37. 
153 R v Barreiro-Teixeira, above n 124, para 52; R v Hooper, above n 150, para 35. 
154 Hunter v Police, above n 85 para 46. 
155 R v Clayton, above n 120, paras 33 and 42. 
156 R v Kata, above n 86, paras 94 and 102. 
157 For example, see R v lwihora (HC), above n 98, para 18; R v Taylor, above n 152, para 37; R 
v Paku (30 May 2006) HC HAM CRI 2005-019-006408, para 34; R v Cummings, above n 83, 
para 21; R v Collings, above n 139, para 100. 
158 For example, see R v S (5 May 2006) HC AK CRl 2004-090-005245; R v Taylor, above n 
152, R v Noble [2006] 3 NZLR 551 (HC), R v Barreiro-Teixeira, above n 124. 
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Of these three considerations, only the nature of the breach is being 
balanced with any regularity. Thus, the nature of the breach inquiry is in many 
cases the sole vehicle for vindicating an accused's rights. In this way, the 
operation of the Shaheed test amounts to relegation of the freedoms affirmed to 
be "matters to be given some weight in the exercise of judicial discretion", a 
situation described in R v Te Kira as "inconsistent with the concept of a Bill of 
Rights ." 159 In order to remedy this situation, the fact of the breach ought to be 
considered as the startpoint to the exercise, while the nature of the breach 
remains to be considered within the body of the balancing test. The tendency to 
overlook the nature of the right concept may be understandable, given that all 
the criminal process rights which are likely to be at issue in an exclusion of 
improperly obtained evidence situation are probably considered to be similarly 
fundamental. For this reason, in cases other than search and seizure cases the 
nature of the right would be given a similar weight every time, and it would be 
unnecessary to pit one against another. It is clear that in these cases, the nature 
of the right issue has little to contribute to the balancing exercise. 
2 Seriousness of the offence 
Prior to Shaheed, one of the grounds on which the introduction of a 
balancing test was opposed was that the consideration of "the seriousness of the 
offence," amongst other factors, was inappropriate because it could "provide no 
sufficient answer to the accused's cry for vindication of rights." 160 In R v 
Goodwin, when the Solicitor-General argued that the seriousness of offending 
should be considered relevant to the admissibility of improperly obtained 
evidence, he tempered his submission with an acknowledgement that "the 
importance to the accused of the rights violated would have to be weighed as 
well." 161 While refraining from providing a definite answer to this argument, 
Cooke P mentioned that it strayed into "difficult territory", and that it "might 
seem odd that an alleged drunken driver should have stronger Bill of Rights Act 
159 R v Te Kira, above n 17, 262, per Cooke P. 
160 Mahoney, above n 10, 453. 
161 R v Goodwin, above n 8, 171. 
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protection than an alleged murderer." 162 The caution with which this 
consideration was treated in Goodwin was not reflected in Shaheed, which 
considered the seriousness of the offence only on the public interest side of the 
scale. 163 This treatment created an inappropriate bias within the test towards 
admissibility by failing to adequately acknowledge that it is ''precisely in 
serious circumstances ... that a court should be most solicitous about ensuring 
that the Bill of Rights is followed." 164 This bias needs to be addressed by the 
acknowledgement that where improperly obtained evidence relates to serious 
offending, this factor necessarily simultaneously supports both admissibility and 
exclusion. This was acknowledged in R v Samuelu, where Frater J commented 
that while " the public has an enhanced interest in the successful prosecution of 
serious crimes . . . those accused of such crimes l1ave a greater need to ensure 
that they are afforded their fundamental rights." 165 In holding that the 
seriousness of the offending was insufficient to counterbalance the breach, he 
acknowledged that "[t]he public has a sense of fair play" and "do not want a 
conviction at any price." 166 I do not suggest that in circumstances of serious 
offending the public interest in convicting criminals will not outweigh the 
accused's increased interest in Bill of Rights procedural safeguards. However, 
the Court should have recognised that the weight to be given to the seriousness 
of the offence must necessarily be limited because of the internal compromise 
inherent within that factor. 
3 Centrality of the evidence to the prosecution 's case 
The Shaheed treatment of the centrality of the evidence as pointing only 
towards admissibility gives rise to similar concerns. The courts have an 
enhanced responsibility to meaningfully enforce an accused's rights when 
considering the admissibility of evidence that is crucial to a prosecution, given 
that their liberty may be at stake. 167 As with the seriousness of offending, the 
162 Ibid. 
163 R v Shaheed, above n 1, para 152 Blanchard, Richardson and Tipping JJ. 
164 Optican and Sankoff, above n 2, 24. 
165 R v Samue/u [2005] BCL 630 (HC), para 134. 
166 Ibid, para 135. 
167 Optican and Sankoff, above n 2, 24. 
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Court should have specified that this factor must be treated with caution as it 
necessarily simultaneously supports both exclusion and admission. 
4 Reliability 
It is appropriate at this point to discount some concerns presented in 
academic commentary regarding the treatment of reliability of evidence. While 
Blanchard J made clear that this factor was to be a particularly compelling one 
by stating that evidence of doubtful reliability was to be given "little or no 
weight", 168 Optican took the argument one step further an advocated the 
treatment of reliability as a knockout blow rather than merely another factor. 169 
He argued that "any real doubts about the trustworthiness of a confession ... 
should lead absolutely to the statement's exclusion". 170 Despite steadfastly 
advocating the removal of the reliability element from the balancing test and 
reinstating it in a 'gatekeeper role', 171 Optican overlooks the fact that his main 
objection to letting causation have such a role, that there is too much scope for 
judicial disagreement as to what constitutes an insufficient causal connection, 
has some application to the reliability point also. This is illustrated by R v 
Siauane, where Courtney J surprisingly considered that the evidence was high-
quality despite the fact that it was a confessional statement made in unfair 
circumstances. 172 There is also the general objection that a properly informed 
balancing exercise requires the ability to take reliability into account. In my 
opinion, the treatment of reliability in Shaheed did not contribute to the bias 
within the test towards admissibility. 
5 Cumulative effect 
The tendency to inappropriately overlook the fact of a breach, coupled 
with the one-sided consideration of seriousness and centrality, contributes to the 
general bias within the Shaheed test towards admissibility. This supports 
168 Ibid. 
169 Optican, above n 3, 500. 
170 Ibid. 
171 Ibid 
172 R v Siauane, above n 84, para 50. 
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Optican's point that Shaheed demonstrates a judicial policy preference for an 
exclusionary rule based on "crime control values" rather than rights protection 
and "due process", 173 to the point of falling short of the their obligation to 
vindicate abuses of rights. Thus, at the point that Williams was decided, the 
concerns about the mechanics of the test were coupled with concerns relating to 
the substantive bias towards admissibility of evidence. 
III WILLIAMS 
A Summary 
In Williams, the Court referred to earlier inconsistency in the application 
of the Shaheed test and attempted to construct a systematic approach to its 
application to help lower courts reach consistent results. 174 
Firstly, they clarified that the starting point must be the nature of the 
right and the nature of the breach, 175 which reflects the starting point of the 
Shaheed inquiry. 176 Under this head it is permitted to have regard to a hierarchy 
of rights as recognised in international law. 177 We are told that in search and 
seizure cases this factor may be considered either separately or as part of the 
seriousness of the breach inquiry, as the seriousness of the breach limb will 
involve an assessment of the nature of the privacy interest breached. 178 
The seriousness of the breach inquiry is separated into consideration of 
the extent of the illegality' 79 and the nature of the privacy interest, 180 and 
consideration of any aggravating and mitigating factors. 181 The considerations 
encompassed in the seriousness of the breach inquiry as envisaged by Williams 
173 Optican and Sankoff, above n 2, 19. 
174 R v Williams, above n 4, para 147, Glazebrook J and William Young P. 
175 Ibid, para I 06. 
176 R v Shaheed, above n I, para 145 Blanchard, Richardson and Tipping JJ. 
177 R v Williams, above n 4, para 107, Glazebrook J and William Young P. 
178 Ibid, para 109. 
179 lbid, para 110-112. 
180 Ibid, para l 13-115. 
181 Ibid, para 116-129. 
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roughly correspond to those relevant to the nature of the breach under 
Shaheed. 182 
The extent of the illegality inquiry involves consideration of how far the 
breach fell short of what would be required for the search or seizure to be 
lawful. 183 As was expressed in R v Jefferies, "there are degrees of unlawfulness, 
ranging from the result of a technical or inconsequential procedural breach to a 
flagrant violation of a right." 184 
The nature of the privacy interest inquiry reflects the idea that different 
types of property can attract varying degrees of privacy interests. This idea 
comes from early important search and seizure cases such as R v Jefferies and R 
v Grayson & Taylor. 185 It also finds some oblique support in Shaheed, where it 
was said that the taking of a bodily sample is an especially serious invasion of 
privacy because of its intrusive nature. 186 The Court in Williams does not 
acknowledge the fact that the nature of the privacy interest component will only 
be applicable in cases involving the right to be free from unreasonable search 
and seizure. 
Factors which may aggravate the seriousness of a breach include non-
compliance with a statutory code, police misconduct and the unreasonable 
manner of a search. 187 It can be mitigated by factors such as urgency, a weak 
connection between the person and the searched or seized property, and 
attenuation of the causative link between the evidence and the breach. 188 Factors 
which ought to have no bearing on the seriousness of the breach are police good 
faith and the seriousness of the offence. 189 
182 R v Shaheed, above n 1, para 147 Blanchard, Richardson and Tipping JJ. 
183 R v Williams, above n 4, para 110, Glazebrook J and William Young P. 
184 R v Jefferies, above n 34, 315, per Hardie Boys J. 
185 R v Grayson & Taylor, above n 35, 407; R v Jefferies, ibid, 297, per Cooke P. 
186 R v Shaheed1 above n I para 147 Blanchard1 Richardson and Tipping JJ. 
187 R v Williams, above n 4, para 116-121 , Glazebrook J and William Young P. 
188 Ibid, para 122-129. The treatment of urgency and non-compliance with a statutory code as 
mitigating factors dates back to the prima facie exclusionary rule, see for example R v Jefferies, 
above n 34, 305, per Richardson J. 
189 Rv Williams, ibid, para 130-131. 
The choice of aggravating and mitigating factors reflects fundamental 
changes in the Shaheed calculus. It can be seen that alternative lawful 
investigative techniques, previously a separate factor under Shaheed, 190 is now 
relevant in two ways. It can lessen the seriousness of the breach where its 
existence was unknown to the police, 191 whereas if the police did know or ought 
to have known of its existence it will become an aggravating factor. Similarly 
the conduct of the police, once a separate factor, is now relevant as an 
aggravating factor. 192 While adopting the Shaheed position that any police state 
of mind equivalent to gross carelessness or worse will aggravate the seriousness 
of a breach, 193 the Court in WWiams adds a gloss that the "practical realities of 
policing must be borne in mind" and note that "mere sloppiness" will not attract 
judicial sanction. 194 Attenuation of causation and inevitable discovery, once 
knock.out blows under Shaheed, are now treated as mitigating factors within the 
b 1 . · 195 a ancmg exercise. 
Once the senousness of the breach is assessed, it is to be balanced 
against the public interest factors; the seriousness of the offending and the 
nature and quality of the evidence.196 In the course of justifying the inclusion of 
the seriousness of the offence on the public interest side, the Court in Williams 
repeats the justification from Shaheed that "[weight] is given to the seriousness 
of the crime not because the infringed right is less valuable to a person accused 
of serious crime but in recognition of the enhanced public interest in convicting 
and confining those who have committed serious crimes". 197 The nature and 
quality of the evidence point is to encompass probative value, relevance, and 
reliability. 198 Of these three, only reliability is specifically dealt with in 
Shaheed, 199 raising the question of what may be usefully added by the inclusion 
of the probative value and relevance points. Finally, consistently with Shaheed, 
190 R v Shaheed, above n I, para l 50 Blanchard, Richardson and Tipping JJ. 
191 R v Williams, above n 4, para l 10, Glazebrook J and William Young P. 
192 Ibid, para 119-121. 
193 R v Shaheed, above n l , para 148 Blanchard, Richardson and Tipping JJ. 
194 R v Williams, above n 4, para 120, Glazebrook J and William Young P. 
195 R v Shaheed, above n 1, para 146 Blanchard, Richardson and Tipping JJ. 
196 R v Williams, above n 4, para 134-141 , Glazebrook J and William Young P. 
197 Ibid, para 138. 
198 Ibid, para 140. 
199 R v Shaheed, above n 1, para 151 Blanchard, Richardson and Tipping JJ. 
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the Court holds that the centrality of the evidence is relevant to the public 
interest side of the equation, despite its deletion from s 30 of the Evidence 
Act.200 
Once a conclusion has been reached on the seriousness of the breach and 
the strength of the public interest in admissibility, these two are to be balanced 
against each other to determine whether exclusion of the evidence is a 
proportionate response in a given case. 
While the treatment of Shaheed in Williams goes a long way towards 
improving the certainty of the Shaheed test, it fails to seize an opportunity to 
address substantive bias within the test towards admissibility. 
B Extent to which Williams addresses certainty concerns 
While at the time of writing only twenty cases have conducted the 
balancing exercise as modified by Williams or as set out in s 30 of the Evidence 
Act 2006, their experience suggests that the mechanical issues picked up by 
Optican, as modified by my analysis have been largely alleviated by the 
Williams guidance. As with Optican and Sankoff s initial analysis of Shaheed, 
of course, this analysis must necessarily remain tentative until a greater body of 
cases applying the test with the benefit of Williams' guidance have been 
decided. In this part of the essay, I will consider the criticisms one by one and 
the extent to which they have been resolved. 
1 Use of precedent 
The san1ple of cases decided since Williams is consistent with the trend 
noticed above that courts are becoming increasingly willing to make use of 
earlier cases applying Shaheed to help arrive at their own conclusion. Ten of the 
twenty cases made use of various Shaheed precedent in some way. Increasingly, 
the cases demonstrate the ideal use of precedent in a Shaheed case, of 
200 R v Williams, above n 4, para 141 , Glazebrook J and William Young P. 
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comparing the facts with a similar case and deciding the weight to be attributed 
to the relevant factor based on the weight it was given in the earlier case. One 
exan1ple of such a use of precedent is R v Hotai, where a vehicle that was 
locked and parked in front of a private residence was searched.201 This situation 
was distinguished from R v Gillies, where police entered an impounded vehicle 
in order to move it,202 and R v Jwihora, where a disqualified driver had fled the 
scene leaving the driver's door open exposing drugs, 203 in order to find that 
Hotai had a greater expectation of privacy in these circumstances.204 
Surprisingly, given the guidance in Williams that offences were to be considered 
serious if the offender was likely to be sentenced to four or more years' 
imprisonment, only one case compared similar cases to assist with sentencing 
d. · 205 pre 1ctions. 
2 Inadequate balancing 
It will be remembered that Optican's concerns about adequate balancing 
concerned "perfunctory or conclusive reasoning", "mysteriously selective" 
application, and "focus[ing] on one or more considerations to the exclusion of 
others relevant to the case."206 To this I added my own concern that some 
judgments dealt with the same factor in more than one place, giving rise to the 
suspicion of double counting of particular factors. 
The sample of cases since Williams shows that Optican's concerns of 
inadequate balancing have all but disappeared. It seems that courts are taking 
seriously the necessity to carry out the balancing exercise "conscientiously, so 
that ... it will be clear that the right has been taken seriously".207 Where 
conclusions appear to be the result of inadequate balancing, there is reason not 
to be overly concerned. For example, although evidence from a second search 
was admitted in R v Whimp without making any reference to factors on the 
20 1 R v Hotai (9 March 2007) HC WN CRI 2005-091-004324, para 38. 
zoz R v Gillies (4 April 2006) CA 470/05. 
203 R v Iwihora (HC), above n 98. 
204 R v Hotai, above n 201 , para 38. 
205 R v Yeh, above n 142, para 92. 
206 Optican, above n 3,461. 
201 R v Williams, above n 4, para l 04, Glazebrook J and William Young P. 
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public interest side of the equation, it can be assumed that the public interests 
factors mentioned in regard to the initial search were considered to be applicable 
to both.208 Similarly, although Courtney J in R v Yeh neglects to consider the 
extent of the illegality when deciding whether evidence obtained as a result of 
an unreasonable search should be admitted, this failure is forgivable in light of 
the ultimate conclusion in favour of exclusion.209 
Some cases decided after Williams again refer to the same factor at more 
than one point in the analysis, giving rise to a fear of double counting. For 
example, in R v Beazley & Ors (No 9) the issue of characterising the conduct of 
police was considered both under the extent of the illegality and as an 
aggravating factor. 210 In R v Yeh in the context of the search of Mr Ren the 
perceived urgency of the situation is dealt with twice,211 as is the availability of 
lawful investigative techniques in R v Petricevich.212 However, again the 
concerns raised by these examples can be overstated, as in both Beazley and Yeh 
the evidence was ultimately excluded, and in Petricevich the analysis was 
obiter. Also, in these cases it is unclear whether the judges in fact 
inappropriately counted the relevant factors twice. 
3 Consideration of inappropriate factors 
The sample of cases decided since Williams contains no examples of 
good faith being treated as anything other than a neutral factor. There is no 
longer any reason to object to the inclusion in the balance of any attenuation of 
causation or inevitable discovery, as Williams makes clear that these 
considerations are no longer to be accorded knockout status. 
208 R v Whimp (2 April 2007) CA 451 /06, para 56. 
209 R v Yeh, above n 142, para 94. 
210 R v Beazley & Ors (No 9) (9 May 2007) HC AK CRJ 2006-004-3200, paras 100 and 114; 
however they judgment could have been influenced by Williams itself, which mentions police 
conduct in both contexts. 
211 R v Yeh, above n 142, para 80. 
212 R v Petricevich (30 July 2007) CA 236/07, para 36(e) and (f). 
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The only example of consideration of an inappropriate factor in this 
sample was seen in R v Beazley & Ors. 213 In that case police conducted a 
thorough search of a family residence that involved searching "bedrooms and 
areas which attract a particularly high expectation of privacy, such as drawers or 
cupboards".214 Despite this, it was considered relevant that the laboratory 
equipment and materials discovered were "in plain view in a rw11pus room 
leading off the lounge", where privacy expectations are lower.
215 In my opinion, 
when assessing the nature of an infringed privacy interest the search should be 
considered at its most intrusive point, regardless of where the seized items were 
in fact found. 
4 Questionable interpretation of factors 
Before Williams, problems with the interpretation of factors manifested 
themselves in confusion as to whether the seriousness of the offence limb 
related to the maximum penalty available for the charged offence or the 
consequences of the particular offending in question, and in legitimate judicial 
disagreement as to how certain Shaheed factors were to be interpreted. 
Williams' clarifies that the assessment of the seriousness of offending 
relates to the likely consequences to the particular offender.
216 While subsequent 
cases have continued to refer to maximum penalties, this often only occurs in 
the course of deciding the likely consequences in a particular case.
217 Of course, 
even after Williams the assessment of the seriousness of offending is not 
without controversy, as is apparent from the conflicting approaches that have 
been taken to the application of the Williams guidance. An overly rigid 
approach to the seriousness guidance was seen in R v Yeh, where Courtney J 
declined to treat the offending as serious in terms of Williams because it was 
"unlikely to attract a sentence of imprisonment of more that about three-and-a-
213 R v Beazley & Ors, above n 210. 
2 14 Ibid, para 106. 
215 lbid, para 107. 
2 16 R v Williams, above n 4, para 135, Glazebrook J and William Young P. 
217 R v Horsfall (3 September 2007) HC AK CRI 2006-090-2930, para 106; B1y ham v DIA (22 
August 2007) HC WHA CRI 2007-488-39, para 30. 
half years."218 While this reasoning reflects the danger inherent in setting 
thresholds such as this within a balancing exercise, the majority of cases treat 
the guidance with an appropriate degree of flexibility. 219 In Connelly v Police 
the Hon Justice Ron Hansen rejected a submission that the Williams guidance 
was to be treated as a code, and confirmed that offending that was insufficient to 
meet the threshold could be aggravated by the presence of other factors, such as 
a threat to public safety.220 
Following Williams, there are still examples of legitimate judicial 
disagreement as to the appropriate interpretation of particular factors. For 
example, in R v Hotai it was asserted that urgency could only operate as a 
mitigating factor where public safety concerns were involved.221 By contrast, R 
v Whimp held that a risk of destruction of evidence was sufficient to let urgency 
operate as a mitigating factor. 222 Some middle ground between there 
propositions was applied in R v Yeh, where diminished weight was attached to 
the perceived urgency of the situation because no issue of safety was 
involved,223 an approach most consistent with the guidance in Williams. 224 
5 Summary and suggested explanations 
The twenty cases applying the balancing test since Williams suggest that 
it has alleviated most of the certainty concerns enumerated by Optican and 
adopted by me. The trend towards making more use of Shaheed precedent 
continues. Problems involving inadequate balancing only surfaced in cases 
where the evidence was ultimately excluded or where the balancing exercise is 
obiter. Only one case presents an example of the consideration of an 
inappropriate factor. While Optican's original concern about the interpretation 
of the seriousness of the offence factor has been alleviated, there is still some 
218 R v Yeh, above n 142, para 81. 
219 See for example Bryham v DIA, above n 217, para 30. 
22° Connelly v Police (I May 2007) HC CHCH CRI 2006-409-230, para 8. 
221 R v Hotai, above n 20 I, para 40. 
222 R v Whimp, above n 208, para 54. 
223 R v Yeh, above n 142, para 47. 
224 R v Williams, above n 4, para 123, Glazebrook J and William Young P. 
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evidence of legitimate judicial disagreement as to the appropriate interpretation 
of seriousness and urgency. 
This shows that the judgment in Williams has gone a long way towards 
achieving its self-proclaimed goal of "lay[ing] down a structured approach" for 
the Shaheed analysis.225 After incorporating the Williams guidance, the Shaheed 
schema could no longer be legitimately described as a "meandering ... 
'shopping list' of potentially applicable factors. "226 In addition, rather than 
perpetuating a situation where courts are "absolve[d] ... from having to take 
into account all pertinent considerations",227 Williams clarifies that conclusions 
should be drawn for each relevant factor before an overall assessment is 
made.228 While only twenty judgments have been released applying Shaheed 
since Williams, a comparison of these with earlier decisions shows the positive 
effect of the judgrnent in a cosmetic way, in that courts have shown a 
willingness to explicitly adopt and structure judgments around the guidance 
offered by Williams, and come to a conclusion by expressly balancing one side 
against the other. Fifteen of the twenty newer cases considered or discounted 
every relevant factor, whereas from my sample of the earlier cases only twelve 
of 70 had done so. 
To the extent that some of Optican's concerns remain unaddressed by 
the attempt in Williams to coordinate the application of the test, this may be 
explained by the fact that much of its guidance is in terms either too general or 
too specific to provide meaningful assistance to lower courts. A clear example 
of the courts providing guidance at too general a level is its choice of adjectives 
to emphasise the significance of certain factors. For example, the fact that a 
search has been conducted in an unreasonable manner is "a stand alone and 
often very weighty factor."229 Police misconduct is "a controlling factor", 230 the 
strength of an individual's privacy interest is "of major significance",231 the 
225 Ibid,, para 147. 
226 Optican and Sankoff, above n 2, 28-29. 
227 Optican, above n 3, 462. 
228 R v Williams, above n 4, para 132, Glazebrook J and William Young P. 
229 Ibid , para 118. 
230 Ibid,para 119. 
23 1 Ibid, para 124. 
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probative value of the evidence is "very important",232 and the nature of the 
right and the seriousness of the breach is "of fundamental importance. "233 While 
some factors are given elevated importance in this way, the court seems 
reluctant to indicate any factors that are to carry comparatively less weight. The 
closest it comes to marking a factor in a negative way is its warning that 
" [i]nevitability of discovery, even as a factor in the balancing process, should be 
used with caution. "234 If the Court considers that these factors should be 
accorded varying degrees of significance, there is little to indicate which 
descriptive phrase they consider to be stronger than any other, although it could 
be argued that "fundamental importance" and "controlling" are intended to be 
especially meaningful. Alternatively, if these terms are meant to be 
synonymous, the use of a common term would be better. The choice of 
adjectives does little to alleviate the concern that, following Shaheed, courts 
have "no real guidance as to how the relevant factors should be organised, 
weighted [and] balanced against each other".235 
Another aspect of the guidance in Williams that could be seen as too 
general to be useful is the provision of generalisations to indicate whether 
admissibility will be expected where a particular combination of factors is 
present. Firstly, we are told that: 236 
[W]here a breach is minor, the balancing exercise would often lead to evidence 
being admissible where the crime is serious and the evidence is reliable, highly 
probative and crucial to the prosecution case. 
And secondly:23 7 
(i]f the illegality or unreasonableness is serious, the nature of the privacy interest 
strong, and the seriousness of the breach has not been diminished by any 
mitigating factors ... then any balancing exercise would normally lead to the 
exclusion of the evidence, even where the crime was serious. 
232 Ibid, para 140. 
233 Ibid, para 148. 
234 Ibid, para 129. 
235 Optican, above n 3, 454. 
236 R v Williams, above n 4, para 144, Glazebrook J and William Young P. 
23 7 Ibid, para 145. 
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The value of this exercise can be measured by the extent to which these 
examples capture "practically recurring constellations of fact", such that they 
could meaningfully guide lower courts.238 An analysis of the 99 factual 
situations Shaheed has been applied to since October 2004 suggests that the 
combinations of factors reflected in the generalisations are indeed ones that 
occur with some regularity. The combination of all of the factors mentioned in 
the first generalisation has arisen twelve times, assuming that reliability and a 
high probative value can be equated for these purposes.239 The combination of 
all of the factors in the second generalisation has occurred six times.240 Of these, 
two specifically quoted the second generalisation as support for a finding of 
inadmissibility.241 However, the fact that in all of the cases mentioned the 
appropriate result in terms of the Williams generalisations was reached, whether 
or not they were decided before Williams, suggests that these generalisations 
may be superfluous. It is possible that by choosing to limit this exercise to 
"cases at each end of the scale of seriousness",242 the Court has confined itself 
to making commonsense statements too obvious to provide meaningful 
guidance to a lower court judge. 
Also, the Court's suggested systematic formula to help lower courts 
evaluate the seriousness of a breach is too simplistic and underdeveloped to 
offer real assistance. They recommend ranking the extent of illegality of a 
breach on a six-point scale ranging from extremely serious to minor, and 
adjusting the position on the scale based on the presence or absence of various 
238 Optican, above n 3, 533. 
239 See R v Tanner, above n 150; R v Cummings, above n 83; R v Williams (Michael), above n 
85; R v Kata, above n 86; R v Michalaros, above n 94; R v Javid (11 June 2007) CA 3 l 9/06; R v 
Southgate & Anor (14 May 2007) HC HAM CRI 2006-019-002189; R v Stevenson (4 April 
2007) HC WN CRI 2004-019-006376; and R v Hansen (3 April 2007) HC WANG CRI 2006-
083-1727; Bryham v DIA, above n 217; R v Petricevich, above n 212; Connelly v Police, above 
n 220. 
240 See R v Noble, above n 158; Campbell v Police (7 June 2007) HC ROT CRI 2006-463-87; R 
v Beazley & Ors, above n 210; R v McMahon (16 March 2007) CA 291/06; R v Chadd (4 
September 2006) CA 114/06 although it should be noted that as this was not a search and 
seizure case the strong privacy interest aspect was not applicable; R v Yeh , above n 142, with 
respect to the search of Apartment 8. 
24 1 R v Beazley & Ors, ibid, para 114; R v Yeh, ibid, para 93. 
242 R v Williams, above n 4, para 142, Glazebrook J and William Young P. 
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other factors. 243 While a hypothetical scenario is used to demonstrate the type of 
factors that could reduce the illegality,244 no fully worked-out example is 
provided to explain how it ought to be applied in any given case, and it could 
lead to a tick-the-box approach where mitigating or aggravating factors are not 
balanced against each other, as each may come to represent exactly one unit on 
the scale. This outcome would be incompatible with the very nature of a 
balancing test. 
While some parts of the judgment are in terms too general to be of 
assistance to lower courts applying the Shaheed test, occasionally guidance is 
provided in problematic detail. One example is the seemingly arbitrary 
statement that an offence will be considered serious if the offender is likely to 
be sentenced to four or more years' imprisonment, or less if public safety is at 
stake.245 The idea of setting a threshold for serious offending may be considered 
incompatible with the very nature of a balancing test, although it will not 
necessarily cause problems provided that it is treated by courts as a presumption 
rather than a rigid classification. However, even when it is accepted that it is 
necessary to impose a threshold to ensure consistency between decision-makers, 
the problem in Williams is that the choice of the sentencing starting point seems 
arbitrary because it is unsupported by reasoning. In addition, difficulties could 
arise from the decision to consider the likely sentence of a particular offender 
rather than the maximum penalty available for the charged offence, as this 
involves an assessment that judges will be ill-equipped to make at the pre-trial 
stage. 
A second example of problematically specific guidance concerns the 
Court ' s hierarchy of privacy interests in various areas of property, to the level of 
specificity of distinguishing between a front garden and other parts of a garden, 
or between different drawers and cupboards within a house.246 This passage is 
reminiscent of one in R v Bradley where the Court found that a householder has 
a greater privacy interest in a chest of drawers than under a flap of linoleum 
243 Ibid, para 133. 
244 Ibid . 
245 Ibid, para 135. 
246 Ibid, para I I 3. 
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under a bath.247 The New Zealand Law Commission's criticism of that 
statement, that "the practicalities of police operations are impeded by 
dependence on such niceties",248 applies equally to the Court's dicta 111 
Williams. It is easy to conceive of situations where the classification 1s 
inappropriate, such as where a front garden is surrounded by a high fence. 
While it is not suggested that this type of analysis is always unhelpful, 
description of the gradation in such detail imports a risk that lower courts may 
feel compelled to use these comments to apply the test in too rigid a manner, 
despite the acknowledgement in the judgment of the need for flexibility.
249 
A final example is the statement that "a mid-range illegality relating to 
search of the person or a residential property is likely to be regarded more 
seriously than a more serious breach relating to open farmland."
250 This seems 
to assert that the nature of the privacy interest is a more compelling factor than 
the extent of the illegality. As a statement that makes one factor subordinate to 
another in general tem1s, this is an unusually instructive aspect of the judgment. 
While this type of statement is encouraged, its potency means that it should be 
accompanied by some rationale or analysis. The positioning of the statement as 
an afterthought invites a reader to wonder whether its potential significance was 
fully appreciated by the Court. 
However, one must be careful not to judge the Court too harshly for 
providing guidance in terms too general or specific to be of much meaningful 
assistance to lower courts. Some degree of uncertainty is inherent in any 
balancing test, and any evaluation of Williams must acknowledge the inherent 
difficulty of attempting to provide meaningful guidance for the application of 
such a test in a context divorced from facts. 
B Extent to which Williams alleviates admissibility concems 
247 R v Bradley (1997) 15 CRNZ 363 (CA). 
248 New Zealand Law Commission Entry, Search and Seizure (NZLC PP50, Wellington, 2002). 
249 R v Williams, above n 4, para 114, Glazebrook J and William Young P. 
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While Williams goes some way to improve on the mechanics of the 
operation of the test, it leaves the problems regarding the substantive treatment 
of particular factors virtually untouched. 
I Existence of the breach, nature of the right, and nature of the breach 
In the previous section, it was shown that the treatment of the existence 
of a breach, the nature of the right, and the nature of the breach meant that all 
but the nature of the breach were regularly overlooked in practice. With respect 
to these factors, the judgment in Williams further entrenched the status quo. 
Again the existence of the breach was mentioned separately from the balancing 
exercise where it was said that the fact "[t]hat there has been a breach is given 
considerable weight as a very important but not necessarily determinative 
factor. "251 In this respect, Williams may have made an unwitting departure from 
the language of Shaheed, in which the existence of a breach was never described 
in terms as a factor, although it seems that this change has had little practical 
effect. 252 Williams reaffirmed that the nature of the right and the breach is the 
"starting point" of the exercise,253 said that in search and seizure cases the 
nature of the right can always be adequately dealt with by considering the nature 
of the privacy interest, and added that in most other circumstances "the nature of 
the right will not be considered separately but as part of assessing the nature of 
the breach. "254 
I do not object to the guidance in Williams with regard to the treatment 
of the nature of the right as it reflects the reality that in cases dealing with rights 
other than search and seizure, the nature of the right inquiry does not have much 
to contribute to the balancing exercise, as all criminal process rights are likely to 
be considered similarly fundamental. This treatment is also consistent with the 
way that this factor was treated in practice. 
25 1 R v Williams, above n 4, para 104, Glazebrook J and William Young P. 
252 Compare R v Shaheed, above n I, para 156 Blanchard, Richardson and Tipping JJ. 
253 R v Williams, above n 4, para 106, Glazebrook J and William Young P. 
254 lbid, para 109. 
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However, by replicating the treatment of the existence of a breach in 
Shaheed the Court in Williams has missed an oppo1iunity to restructure the test 
so as to give this consideration adequate weight. Cases applying the test since 
Williams indicate that little change has occurred in the treatment of this inquiry. 
Two cases have picked up on Williams' language and mentioned that the fact of 
the breach is to be "given considerable weight as an important but not 
necessarily detenninative factor", 255 and one case referred to the need to 
acknowledge a breach of a "quasi-constitutional right". 256 However, as before 
Williams, the majority either pay lip service to the existence of a breach257 or 
simply conduct the balancing exercise without explicitly referring to it at all.258 
The only way to minimise the effect of the conceptual divide between "the 
purpose notionally served by excluding evidence . . . and the method for 
determining admissibility now set out in Shaheed''259 is to assert the significance 
of this point in real, meaningful terms. By falling short of this standard, 
Williams strikes a balance which inappropriately favours society's interest in the 
prosecution of crime over the vindication of fundamental rights affirmed by the 
Bill of Rights. 
2 Seriousness 
Prior to Williams the concern was that by considering the seriousness of 
offending on the public interest side of the equation only the test failed to give 
adequate protection to the accused's enhanced need for procedural safeguards in 
that situation. In Williams the Court sought to address this point by claiming 
that the accused's greater interest in procedural safeguards in the context of 
serious offending need only be taken into account with respect to confessional, 
rather than real, evidence.260 Their authority for this position is a comment from 
Shaheed which rejected the idea that a trial's fairness could be undermined even 
255 Connelly v Police, above n 220, para 15; R v Wallace (29 June 2007) CA 191/07, para 60. 
256 R v Hansen, above n 239, para 56. 
257 R v Horsfall, above n 217, para 96. 
258 For example, see R v Boon (13 August 2007) HC AK CRJ 2006-004-21763; Bryham v DIA, 
above n 217; R v Yeh, above n 142; R v Petricevich, above n 212. 
259 Optican and Sankoff, above n 2, 22. 
260 R v Williams, above n 4, para 136, Glazebrook J and William Young P. 
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by the use of real evidence of undoubted reliability.26 1 However, Williams 
effectively extends the effect of the proposition by not acknowledging that there 
may be situations where the reliability of real evidence is doubtful. Later in the 
judgment they admit that this could occur where the evidence has been 
compromised by the breach itself in some manner.262 Given that this possibility 
exists, the blanket distinction drawn between real and ·confessional evidence 
imports an inappropriate bias in favour of admissibility where physical evidence 
is concerned. 263 
The Court explicitly and correctly rejects the possibility that the 
seriousness of the offence could operate as a mitigating factor on the seriousness 
of the breach side of the equation, due to a fear of "unnecessary double 
counting."264 However, they do not appear to advert to the possibility that it 
might be more aptly treated as an aggravating factor. In order to adequately 
implement its commitment to vindicating rights, the Court should acknowledge 
that the public interest in a serious offending situation must at least to some 
extent be neutralised the by accused's corresponding increased need for 
procedural safeguards, whether the evidence is real or not. 
3 Centrality 
At the time that Williams was decided, the Court was aware that the 
concerns about the appropriateness of considering the centrality of the evidence 
on the public interest side of the ledger had persuaded the Select Committee to 
remove it as an "extraordinarily inappropriate factor" from consideration under 
s 30(3) of the Evidence Act.265 Against that background, it is surprising that the 
Court saw fit to maintain that the centrality may nevertheless continue to be 
legitimately taken into account as a subset of the nature and quality of the 
evidence inquiry. As a consequence of this approach, the Court in Williams 
26 1 R v Shaheed, above n 1, para 151 Blanchard, Richardson and Tipping JJ. 
262 R v Williams, above n 4, para 140, Glazebrook J and William Young P. 
263 Optican and Sankoff, above n 2, note 80. 
264 R v Williams, above n 4, para 131 , Glazebrook J and William Young P. 
265 (15 November 2006) 635 NZPD 6564; Evidence Bill 2006, no 256-2, cl 25. 
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preserves intact the bias towards admissibility within the Shaheed framework 
insofar as centrality is concerned. 
4 ReUability 
While I do not take exception to the role ascribed to reliability in the 
Shaheed test, its development in Williams introduces the possibility that this 
factor may come to be illegitimately double-counted. As well as being relevant 
to the nature and quality of the evidence, it is indirectly relevant as a result of 
confining the issue of the accused's increased interest in exclusion of evidence 
when charged with more serious offences to confessional evidence situations, as 
this distinction rests on the perceived unreliability of confessional statements as 
opposed to real evidence. A simple way to remove this concern would be to 
hold that the accused's interest in procedural safeguards under the Bill of Rights 
are relevant in all situations where serious crime is charged, not just those where 
the reliability of the evidence is in doubt. 
5 Cumulative effect 
In summary, Williams perpetuates the problems with the existence of a 
breach, the seriousness of the offence and the centrality of the evidence for a 
conviction that existed after Shaheed, as well as introducing a concern that 
reliability may be double-counted. 
IV RELATIONSHIP WITH SECTION 30 EVIDENCE ACT 2006 
Shortly after the judgment in Williams was delivered, the Shaheed test 
for admissibility of improperly obtained evidence as modified by Williams was 
replaced by the statutory test in s 30 of the Evidence Act 2006. The following 
section of this essay will consider the extent to which the judgment in Williams 
will survive the coming into force of the statutory test and consider the best way 
to interpret the new test in order to alleviate the persistent concerns about the 
nature of the Shaheed test, particularly those regarding inadmissibility. 
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A Section 30 
Under s 30 of the Evidence Act 'improperly obtained evidence' is 
defined as evidence obtained in breach of "any rule or enactment",266 
unfairly,267 or in consequence of a statement made by a defendant that would be 
inadmissible if offered by the prosecution.268 
Section 30(2) reflects the structure with which courts already tend to 
approach questions of admissibility under Shaheed. Evidence must first be 
found to have been improperly obtained on the balance of probabilities, before a 
determination is made as to whether exclusion of evidence is a proportionate 
response to the breach. In undertaking the latter inquiry, it specifies that 
appropriate weight must be given to the impropriety as well as "the need for an 
effective and credible system of justice",269 two concerns lifted directly from the 
general guidance paragraph which follows the setting out of the balancing 
exercise in Shaheed. 270 
The next subsection lists the factors that the court may have regard to 
when considering admissibility. 271 The list of factors is explicitly non-
exhaustive, and no indication is given as to whether a specific factor points 
towards admissibility or exclusion.272 The first is the "importance of the right 
breached" and the "seriousness of the intrusion",273 picking up on the "starting 
point" in the Shaheed exercise.274 The concerns from Shaheed about varying 
levels of culpable police conduct are reflected in the "nature of the impropriety" 
factor. 275 However, while Shaheed makes clear that conduct that is deliberate, 
reckless or grossly careless will point strongly towards inadmissibility but that 
266 Evidence Act 2006, s 30(5)(a). 
267 Ibid, s 30(5)(c). 
268 Ibid, s 30(5)(b ). 
269 lbid, s 30(2)(b ). 
210 R v Shaheed, above n I , para 156 B Ian chard, Richardson and Tipping JJ . 
27 1 Evidence Act 2006, s 30(4). 
272 Ibid. 
273 Ibid, s 30(3)(a). 
274 R v Shaheed, above n I, para 14 7. 
275 Evidence Act 2006, s 30(3)(b). 
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good faith is a neutral factor,276 the statutory test for the nature of the 
impropriety asks whether the breach was "deliberate, reckless, or done in bad 
faith",277 a semantic difference which could support an argument that s 30 is not 
aimed at conduct which attracts the gross carelessness label but not worse. The 
nature and quality of the evidence factor is taken directly from Shaheed,278 as is 
the seriousness of the offence279 and the situation where lawful alternative 
investigative techniques were known to the police but not used.280 Interestingly, 
the availability of alternative remedies that may be able to adequately redress 
the breach is included as a factor in the statutory test,281 despite the conclusion 
in Shaheed that "other remedies are unlikely to be found satisfactory to provide 
vindication of the right in a criminal case". 282 The final two factors, the 
consideration of whether the evidence was obtained in circumstances of 
physical danger283 or urgency,284 were not separate factors under Shaheed but 
were explicitly mentioned as relevant to the question of the nature of the 
breach.285 The only factor from Shaheed that is not reflected in some way in the 
statutory list is the centrality of the evidence, which was originally incorporated 
under the nature and quality limb but was deleted at the Select Committee 
stage.286 
B Continued relevance o/Williams 
The value of the Court in Williams undertaking such a comprehensive 
review of the Shaheed test structure may be questioned because of the imminent 
introduction of the statutory test for admissibility of improperly obtained 
evidence with the coming into force of Evidence Act 2006. However, there are a 
number of reasons to suggest that Williams will continue to inform the 
interpretation of s 30 now that it has come into force. Firstly, it is generally 
276 R v Shaheed, above n 1, para 148-149 Blanchard, Richardson and Tipping JJ . 
277 Evidence Act 2006, s 30(3)(b). 
278 Ibid, s 30(3)(c); R v Shaheed, above n I, para 151 Blanchard, Richardson and Tipping JJ. 
279 Evidence Act 2006, s 30(3)(d); R v Shaheed, ibid, para 152. 
280 Evidence Act 2006, s 30(3)(e); R v Shaheed, ibid, para 150. 
28 1 Evidence Act 2006, s 30(3)(t). 
282 R v Shaheed, above n I, para 153 Blanchard, Richardson and Tipping JJ. 
283 Evidence Act 2006, s 30(3)(g). 
284 Ibid, s 30(3)(h). 
285 R v Shaheed, above n I, para 147 Blanchard, Richardson and Tipping JJ. 
286 Evidence Bill 2006 no 256-6, cl 25. 
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accepted that s 30 adopts the Shaheed test, with only mmor alterations and 
supplements.287 Secondly, by stating that their guidance will "assist trial judges 
in determining the weight and relevance to be given to each statutory factor",288 
the Court indicates that it intends for its analysis to survive the Act. Also, the 
majority judgment in Williams is expressly characterised as not conflicting with 
s 30 of the new Act,289 although this conclusion is by no means obvious on a 
close comparison with the statutory test. In particular, the judicial insistence that 
the centrality of evidence to the prosecution's case may still be a relevant factor 
is a departure from s 30,290 given its express removal by the Select 
Committee.29 1 Another example may be the assertion that the inevitability of 
discovery ought to be considered within the balancing exercise despite the 
silence of s 30 on the point.292 Finally, when applying the new s 30 the courts 
have continued to treat Williams as relevant.293 This background clarifies that it 
is almost certain that Williams will continue to inform the application of the new 
statutory test. 
C Suggestions for the future 
Having set out the balancing test in Shaheed, Blanchard J expressed his 
hope that the new approach "should not lead, in most cases, to results different 
from those envisaged in earlier judgments of this Court".294 However, in 
practice approximately half the cases applying the test resulted in the admission 
of disputed evidence,295 far from the "almost automatic exclusion of 
evidence"296 that some commentators argued had been the practical effect of the 
prima facie exclusion rule. The tendency to admit evidence half of the time 
continues after Williams , confirming that Williams has done nothing to address 
287 Richard Mahoney Evidence (2004] 4 NZ Law Review 717, 729; (15 November 2006) 635 
NZPD 6564; R v Williams, above n 4, para 149, Glazebrook J and William Young P. 
288 R v Williams, ibid, para 150. 
289 Ibid, para I 50. 
290 Ibid, para 141. 
291 Evidence Bill, above n 175, cl 25. 
292 R v Williams, above n 4, para 149, Glazebrook J and William Young P. 
293 R v Horsfall, above n 217, paras 31 and I 03 ; R v Boon, above n 258, paras 48-79. 
294 R v Shaheed, above n 1, para 156 Blanchard, Richardson and Tipping JJ. 
295 From my sample of 76 applications of Shaheed to disputed evidence between Optican ' s 2004 
article and Williams, in 36 instances evidence was admitted. 
296 R v Shaheed, above n 1, para 152 Blanchard, Richardson and Tipping JJ. 
the substantive biases inherent in the structure of our Shaheed analysis.297 
Overall, the propo1iion supports Optican's theory that an unspoken objective of 
the Court in Shaheed was to "fashion a jurisprudence of exclusion permitting 
more improperly obtained evidence to be admitted" .298 
This essay does not attempt to debate the relative merits of a balancing 
test for the admissibility of improperly obtained evidence and a prima facie 
exclusion rule. Like Mount, who argued that "balancing tests tend to develop 
rule-like characteristics over time, and that rules tend to attract exceptions 
created to deal considerations of balance and proportionality",299 I doubt that it 
can firmly be said that either approach is preferable. It suffices to say that in 
New Zealand there is no need to take the extreme step of reverting to a prima 
facie exclusionary rule because we have not yet fully explored the capacity for 
adequate vindication of rights within the fran1ework of a balancing test. Until 
the possibility of correcting the bias within the test by changing the way the 
various factors interrelate is fully explored, there is no reason to assume that the 
a balancing test is inherently incapable of vindicating rights. The introduction of 
s 30 provides an ideal backdrop for this exercise, because if the statutory factors 
were interpreted with such an objective in mind, the bias within the test could 
well be ameliorated. The following sections consider the aspects of the s 3 0 test 
that can be interpreted to alleviate lingering concerns about a bias towards 
admissibility, and their appropriate interpretation. 
1 Nature and quality: a continued role for centrality? 
It will be most interesting to see whether the courts will continue to 
follow Williams' lead and insist that the centrality of the evidence to the 
prosecution' s case can be legitimately considered within the "nature and quality 
of the improperly obtained evidence" inquiry.300 It is unusual to see a Court so 
blatantly disregarding a clear indication of legislative intent. The two High 
Court cases that have applied s 30 at the time of writing suggest a judicial 
297 Seven of the 15 cases applying Shaheed since Williams have admitted disputed evidence. 
298 Optican and Sankoff, above n 2, 19. 
299 Mount, above n 58, 64. 
300 Evidence Act 2006, s 30(3)(c). 
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willingness to adopt and support Williams' inclusion of centrality in the 
balancing exercise. In R v Boon, Asher J referred to the original clause 30(3)(c) 
in the Evidence Bill which read:301 
(c) The nature and the quality of the improperly obtained evidence, in particular 
whether it is central to the case of the prosecution. 
He decided that:302 
the centrality clause removed in the drafting process was only providing a 
particular of the ' nature and quality of the improperly obtained evidence.' The 
centrality of the evidence was not a stand-alone individual consideration, and it 
therefore cannot be taken from the deletion, or from the reason expressed by the 
committee, that it was intended that the centrality of the evidence should be put 
entirely to one side. 
The deletion of the clause was characterised as "reflecting a concern that the 
centrality of the evidence to the case of the prosecution ought not to have 
particular emphasis",303 and therefore it was legitimate to take the centrality of 
the evidence into account "with appropriate caution".304 His treatment of the 
centrality issue was cited with approval in R v Horsfall. 305 
I find this reasoning artificial and difficult to reconcile with the Select 
Committee's statement that "we find it difficult to envisage a circumstance 
where [the centrality of the evidence to the prosecution's case] would be 
relevant"306 and their characterisation of centrality as an "extraordinarily 
inappropriate factor." 307 A possible reason why the courts have been willing to 
engage in this kind of sophistry may be that they are concerned to preserve the 
availability of a factor that they have historically found to be particularly 
compelling. In 2004 Optican reported that exclusion of evidence is often linked 
to a situation where "the loss of otherwise probative evidence will not lead to a 
30
' R v Boon, above n 258, para 72. 
302 Ibid, para 75. 
303 Ibid, para 76. 
304 Ibid .. 
305 R v Horsfall, above n 217, para 103. 
306 Select Committee Report on the Evidence Bill, 4. 
307 
( 15 November 2006) 635 NZPD 6564; Evidence Bill 2006, no 256-2, cl 25. 
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total failure of the Crown case."308 The cases included in my sample show a 
similar correlation between the centrality of the evidence and the outcome of the 
balancing test. Of the 69 cases applying Shaheed or s 30 since October 2004 
which specifically dealt with the centrality of the evidence, 47 either admitted 
evidence found to be central or excluded evidence found to be superfluous to a 
successful prosecution. Regardless of their underlying motivation, the courts' 
treatment of centrality does not withstand scrutiny when compared with clear 
statements of the Select Committee's intent when the centrality clause was 
deleted. This seems like an aspect of the Williams guidance that could well be 
reconsidered by the Supreme Court. 
While it seems disingenuous for the courts to continue treating the 
centrality of evidence as a factor in light of the available statements of 
legislative intent, I do not believe that the Supreme Court's overturning of this 
aspect of the judgment in Williams is necessary to ensure the adequate 
protection of rights. I do not accept the argument that centrality needs to be 
discarded altogether as representing the "worst kind of consequentialist 
logic", 309 because some degree of consequentialist reasoning is inherent in any 
kind of public interest proportionality-balancing test. A preferable approach is 
to consider it to the extent that it remains a live issue after the accused's 
increased interest in procedural safeguards and the public interest in 
discouraging police transgressions have been taken into account. For this 
reason, it would be legitimate to have centrality as a factor supporting admission 
although it should be acknowledged that the extent to which it can do so is 
necessarily limited. In practice, this factor as well as the seriousness of 
offending should be subordinate to factors on the other side, such as the 
dominant consideration of the existence of breach. Thus, even if the Supreme 
Court were to endorse the Williams approach to centrality, adequate safeguards 
for the rights of defendants could be provided for if Asher J' s acknowledgement 
that this factor must be treated "with appropriate caution" were to be given 
meaningful effect in this manner.310 
308 Optican, above n 3, 530. 
309 Optican and Sankoff, above n 2, 24. 
310 R v Boon, above n 258, para 76. 
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Should the Supreme Court insist that centrality is not a relevant factor, 
Optican's argument that the reliability of challenged evidence should be treated 
as a knockout blow would be effectively defeated, as the "nature and quality of 
the improperly obtained evidence" limb would be hollow.3 11 The cases that have 
been decided to date applying Shaheed do offer some candidates for what this 
inquiry could encompass if both centrality and reliability were considered not to 
have a place within the balancing test. The volume of evidence found has been 
considered in some search and seizure cases, although usually and more 
appropriately in relation to the seriousness of the offending rather than quality 
of the evidence.312 Another possible element that has been considered as part of 
the quality factor is the inculpatory or exculpatory nature of the evidence, 
although there is apparently some doubt as to which side of the balance it 
supports. In R v Mitchell the fact that information gained through a breach was 
exculpatory and consistent with later statements was found to point towards 
admissibililty,31 3 while in R v Hooper inculpatory statements were found to 
point the same way.314 A third candidate is the probative value of evidence, 
which was considered separately from reliability in R v Paku.315 Williams states 
that quality inquiry encompasses "probative value, relevance, and reliability."316 
However, its inclusion ins 30(3)(c) would be superfluous given the presence of 
the general probative value versus prejudicial effect provision in the new Act.317 
If the centrality of the evidence, its volume, its probative value, and its 
inculpatory and exculpatory nature are too problematic to form the basis of the 
quality inquiry, that only leaves reliability. Therefore, there is force to the 
argument that without a reliability component the quality inquiry would be 
hollow. 
2 Seriousness 
3 11 Evidence Act 2006, s 30(3)(c). 
312 See for example R v Pierce, above n 117, para 45 ; R v Harris (IO December 2004) HC ROT 
CRI 2003-087-003480, para 25 ; R v M, above n 83 , para 24. 
313 R v Mitchell (HC), above n 96, para 35. 
314 R v Hoop er, above n 150, para 38. 
3 15 R v Paku, above n 157, para 42. 
3 16 R v Williams, above n 4, para 140, Glazebrook J and William Young P. 
3 17 Evidence Act 2006, s 8. 
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Under s 30, "the seriousness of the offence with which the defendant is 
charged" is one statutory factor. No indication is given as to whether it points 
wholly or partially towards admissibility or otherwise, but subsequent case law 
suggests that courts will continue to treat it as favouring the public interest side 
of the balance.318 However, especially given the silence of the section as to 
which way this factor points, there is nothing to stop the courts from being 
explicitly acknowledging that the seriousness of the offence factor, like 
centrality of the evidence, must be used with caution because of its inherently 
conflicted nature. 
3 Alternative remedies 
At first glace, the inclusion of "whether there are alternative remedies to 
exclusion of the evidence which can adequately provide redress to the 
defendant" as a statutory factor seems like a retrograde step in terms of 
protecting rights.3 19 Blanchard J in Shaheed instructed that "[i]t is ... preferable 
where a conviction ought to lead to a sentence of imprisonment, to put out of 
consideration the possibility of a means of redress other than exclusion of the 
disputed evidence".320 As a result, cases applying Shaheed before the 
introduction of the statutory test have omitted any analysis of alternative 
remedies from their analysis, with one exception.32 1 However, it is often 
overlooked that Shaheed was silent as to whether consideration of alternative 
remedies was appropriate where the likely punishment was something less than 
imprisonment. For example, when fines are the relevant penalty, monetary 
compensation would probably be capable of providing adequate recompense. If 
the relevance of the alternative remedies statutory factor was treated as being 
confined to the few cases where a penalty short of imprisonment is anticipated, 
some meaning could be given to this factor without compromising the rights of 
criminal defendants. 
3 18 
R v Horsfall, above n 217, paras 106 and 107; R v Boon, above n 258, paras 62-63 . 
3 19 Evidence Act 2006, s 30(3)(t). 
320 R v Shaheed, above n 1, para 155 Blanchard, Richardson and Tipping JJ . 
32 1 R v Merrett (3 March 2006) CA 280/05, para 26. 
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4 Existence of a breach 
The need to take into account the existence of a breach is reflected in the 
statutory test with the requirement that the balancing process "gives appropriate 
weight to the impropriety but also takes proper account of the need for an 
effective and credible system of justice."322 By including these considerations 
separately from the list of factors to be weighed in the balancing exercise, s 30 
mirrors the approach taken in both Shaheed323 and Williams. 324 While the 
separation from the other factors may have been intended to indicate overriding 
significance, it has been shown that this often amounts to this "very important 
but not necessarily determinative factor" being ignored, a practice which is 
likely to continue.325 While the statutory language does not describe the fact of a 
breach as emphatically as Williams does, the wording of the test is perfectly 
capable of bearing an interpretation that gives the fact of the impropriety greater 
significance. In tenns of adequately vindicating rights, the existence of a breach 
is a more logical starting point than the nature of the right and breach, which 
was described as such in Shaheed and Williams and is reproduced in 
s 30(3)(a).326 In addition, a judicial practice should be developed of treating the 
fact of a breach as a conceptual, rather than merely chronological, starting point. 
The effect of this would be that the "very important" factor of the existence of 
the breach, while still "not necessarily determinative", would only be overridden 
in cases of minor breach. 327 
5 Effect on certainty concerns 
Optican suggested that the problems of certainty he identified in 
Shaheed were a result of "more fundan1ental contradictions arising from the 
new proportionality-balancing test". 328 It may indeed be the case that certainty 
322 Evidence Act 2006, s 30(2)(b). 
323 R v Shaheed, above n 1, para 156. 
324 R v Williams, above n 4, para 104, Glazebrook J and William Young P. 
325 Ibid. 
326 R v Shaheed, above n I, para 147 Blanchard, Richardson and Tipping JJ; R v Williams, ibid, 
para 106. 
327 Ibid. 
328 Optican, above n 3, 475 . 
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concerns can never be fully minimised until the substantive concerns within the 
test are addressed. The unhelpfully general or specific guidance provided in 
Williams can be seen as symptomatic of the conflict involved in "mak[ing] the 
usual bow" to the vindication of rights while preserving the structural elements 
of the Shaheed test which send "a clear message ... that not all breaches of rights 
will be vindicated".329 If the structmal elements of the test were brought into 
line with its ostensible rationale, there would be no need for judicial guidance to 
shy away from clear statements in abstract terms about which factors are to be 
subordinate to others. 
Even if the uncertainty concerns were not resolved as a consequence of 
addressing the bias towards admissibility, these issues were largely corrected by 
Williams. After all, some degree of certainty will always be expected in any 
balancing test. 
V CONCLUSION 
Prior to Williams, the Shaheed test and its application in New Zealand 
had been criticised for its uncertainty as well as its promotion of crime control 
values at the expense of a commitment to due process.330 Williams largely 
addresses the certainty concern by providing an explicit structme to guide the 
exclusionary calculus. However, parts of its guidance are understandably 
phrased either too generally problematically specifically to create certainty or 
meaningfully guide lower courts in difficult cases. 
While achieving partial success with respect to uncertainty concerns, 
Williams does nothing to alleviate the problem of the inadequate protection of 
rights, as its adoption of the treatment of particular factors from Shaheed 
perpetuates the bias towards admissibility that characterises that test. The 
criticism that the exercise can be justifiably viewed as "a judicial tool to 
329 Optican and Sankoff, above n 2, 21 . 
330 Optican, above n 3, 533. 
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sanction police misconduct, rather than a mechanism for vindicating 
fundamental rights"331 is as equally applicable after Williams as it was before. 
With the recent introduction of the statutory test for admissibility of 
improperly obtained evidence in s 30 of the Evidence Act 206, the courts have 
an opportunity to reconsider the way the factors are conceived of and interrelate 
in order to give adequate protection to the rights of the accused. The test would 
be better able to vindicate rights effectively if the existence of a breach is given 
greater weight, the inherently conflicted nature of the seriousness and centrality 
factors is acknowledged, and the scope for consideration of alternative remedies 
is narrowly construed. 
33 1 Ibid, 532. 
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